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The current research focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of two common types of 
spatially different organizations of information (i.e., spatially stacked vs. distributed) and their 
impact on science problem solving. The research is based on the premise that we must better 
understand the spatial organization of information from the perspective of cognitive performance 
and expertise theories to further our theoretical understanding and provide a practical guide for 
using and developing effective information visualizations. A new theoretical decomposition and 
matched analytic technique using eye-tracking is introduced, and is used to tease apart 
interactions with expertise. Seventy novice scientists and 38 experts participated in the study. 
They solved a data interpretation problem using either a distributed or a stacked display. Overall, 
novices took longer to solve the problem when they work with a distributed display than with a 
stacked display, and eye-tracking data suggests the effect is due to information overload and data 
management time. By contrast, experts showed a reverse trend (i.e., faster problem solving with 
distributed displays), being better able to manage complex information. As for the underlying 
mechanism, three factors  (i.e., information internalization, information access, and information 
externalization costs) were examined and found critical to explain the effect. Both groups 
showed trade offs among the three factors as an adaptive behavior for effectively balancing the 
information access costs. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Psychologists and human factors researchers have argued for the importance of visual display 
design alike. A vast number of studies found that different visual displays of the same 
information (i.e., informationally equivalent displays) can yield drastically different task 
performance because different visual displays are not computationally equivalent (Breslow, 
Trafton, & Ratwani, 2009; Carpenter & Shah, 1998; Gattis & Holyoak, 1996; Hegarty, Canham, 
& Fabrikant, 2010; Kroft & Wickens, 2002; Larkin & Simon, 1987; Novick & Catley, 2007; 
Ratwani, Trafton, & Boehm-Davis, 2008; Sanfey & Hastie, 1998; Shah & Carpenter, 1995; Yeh 
& Wickens, 2001; Zhang & Norman, 1994). For example, two sets of informationally equivalent 
graphs were found to be computationally different, and the computational advantages of a new 
representation could even outweigh the lack of familiarity issues (Peebles & Cheng, 2003). If 
visual display design has a significant impact for simple displays of small-scale data (e.g., a 
graph), then the impact should be even greater for complex displays of larger scale data. With 
technology-based change in visual presentation and complexity of tasks, research on the role of 
visual display design in complex tasks is essential, as recently noted by Hegarty (2011, p. 450): 
“developments in information technologies have led to new challenges of how to visualize large 
and complex data sets with researchers in scientific visualization focusing on displays of 
spatially distributed data (e.g., the development of a thunderstorm) and researchers in 
 2 
information visualization focusing more on visualization of abstract information spaces (e.g., 
semantic relations between documents).”  
The current research focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of two types of spatial 
organization and their impact on novice and professional scientists. The research is based on the 
premise that we must better understand the spatial organization of information from the 
perspective of cognitive performance and expertise theories to provide a practical guide for using 
and developing effective information visualizations. Specifically, the research examines (1) the 
processing of complex visual information of (2) real scientists doing real-world tasks, and thus 
contributing (3) to extend the cognitive psychology of science and expertise. This study also 
generates specific implications for the design of hardware and software that scientists use. In 
short, this research utilizes and extends fundamental cognitive psychology of information 
processing to both understand and benefit the work of scientists and scientists-in-training.  
Many researchers have examined the ways in which users interact with large displays and 
what performance benefits they gain in using large rather than small displays for the completion 
of various tasks, such as spatial orientation, reading comprehension, and programming (Grudin, 
2001; Mynatt, Igarashi, Edwards, & LaMarca, 1999; Robertson et al., 2005; Tan, Gergle, 
Scupelli, & Pausch, 2003, 2004). These studies often find that large displays are better (for a 
review: Czerwinski et al., 2006). However, while many scientists have adopted dual or large 
screens, other scientists now spend less time using large monitors or have removed desktops 
entirely from their work and home, relying instead on the smaller screens found in high-powered 
ultra-light laptops, multi-touch display tablet computers, and Internet-enabled smartphones. Is 
this move to smaller screens detrimental to complex work like science?  
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Some research suggests that larger displays are not always beneficial to problem solving. 
In Kroft and Wickens (2002), pilots-in-training were significantly slower in answering questions 
exclusively relevant to just one map when using a large integrative display, but faster and more 
accurate in answering integrative questions (i.e., questions that must be answered by combining 
information from two maps). Critically, the pattern of results suggests that the issue is likely not 
the size per se but rather the spatial organization (see Figure 1)—the observed effects of raw size 
of display are likely caused by different organizations of information that different display sizes 
tend to require (Jang & Schunn, 2012; Jang, Schunn, & Nokes, 2011).  
 
  
Figure 1. Examples of display maps spatially integrated and separated. From Kroft, P. D., & Wickens, C. D. 
(2002). Displaying multi-domain graphical database information. Information Design Journal, 11(1), p48, 
Figure 2. Reprinted with kind permission from John Benjamins Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam/Piladelphia. www.benjamins.com. 
 
The importance of intelligent use of space, whether in 2D or 3D, was demonstrated in a 
variety of previous studies (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000; Kirsh, 1995; Kirsh & Maglio, 
1994). Human as “spatially located creatures” are bound to space and effective use of space often 
reduces time and effort needed to complete a task (Hollan et al., 2000). Also, people often use 
space as a resource and manipulate spatial arrangements to simplify choice, perception, and 
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internal computation (Kirsh, 1995). Thus, it may be that what is important is not only what data 
is shown, but also how it is shown to assist timely perception, information integration, and 
comprehension.  
1.1 SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF VISUALLY PRESENTED INFORMATION 
Traditionally, when talking about spatial organization of information displays, the focus of past 
research was on whether information is presented in an integrative or a separated manner. 
Integrative displays converge multiple sources of information into a single source (see Error! 
Reference source not found.). For example, when students study a worked example to learn 
geometry, text instruction can be placed inside the accompanying picture, thus removing the 
cognitive load required for mental integration. In contrast, separated displays (the middle 
column) provide to-be-integrated information in disparate spaces and effortful mental integration 
must precede any learning. Researchers in both education and human factors have argued for the 
benefits of integrative displays over separated displays for tasks that require information 
integration (Kroft & Wickens, 2002; Sweller, van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998).  
Related to but importantly different from the distinction of integrated vs. distributed 
displays is another display organization contrast relevant to integrative tasks: spatially distributed 
displays (i.e., when information sources are presented side-by-side) versus stacked displays (i.e., 
when information sources are sitting on top of one another with only the top source fully visible). 
For example, when a meteorologist attempts to make a forecast by integrating information from 
a large number of maps (e.g., air pressure, wind speed, and cloud distribution maps by the unit 
time- and height-interval), a single integrative display is not a practical option because 
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superimposing even three such information rich maps would be enough to make the display so 
cluttered that it would be hard to search and perceive critical information. Because there are so 
many different information views to examine, the viable options are then to stack the different 
displays within a small physical space or to distribute the displays across a large physical space. 
  
Table 1. Three types of display organization. The image of a stacked display here presents partially 
overlapped contents to reveal what was stacked but the two contents should be imagined as fully overlapped. 
Integrated  Separated 
  Distributed Stacked 
A
B CD
E
55°
45°
(1)
180° - 55° - 45°
= 80°
80°(2)
 
 
A
B CD
E
In the above Figure, find a value for Angle DBE.
Solution: 
Angle ABC = 180° - Angle BAC – Angle BCA
= 180° - 55° - 45°
= 80°
Angle DBE = Angle ABC
= 80°
55°
45°
 
In the above Figure, find a value for 
Angle DBE.
Solution: 
Angle ABC = 180° - Angle BAC – Angle 
BCA
= 180° - 55° - 45°
= 80°
Angle DBE = Angle ABC
= 80°
A
B CD
E
55°
45°
 
 
A number of prior studies on this contrast have consistently found large performance 
benefits of spatially distributed displays over stacked displays across studies in instruction 
designs and problem-solving domains (Jang & Schunn, 2012; Jang et al., 2011; Jang, Trickett, 
Schunn, & Trafton, 2012). For example (see Table 2), college students solved integrative 
problems almost two times faster without any loss of accuracy when information or learning 
instructions were provided in a distributed format (e.g., 20 information pages printed and pinned 
on a wall or 4 pages of instructions printed on 11”x17” paper); we have coined this phenomena 
the distributed display time advantage.  
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Table 2. Examples of display formats used in prior studies. 
Display 
Type 
Jang, Schunn, & 
Nokes (2011) Jang & Schunn (2012) 
Jang, Trickett, Schunn, & 
Trafton (2012) 
Spatially 
Distributed 
   
Spatially 
Stacked 
  
 
 
1.2 REAL SCIENTISTS DOING REAL-WORLD TASKS 
When considering how easy a transition from a stacked to a distributed display is, the time 
advantage is practically very important. For example, it is a simple matter to switch from one 
monitor to two, to adopt a large screen that affords viewing multiple windows, or simply to print 
documents and spread them out on a table. The magnitude of the effect may be even larger in a 
professional science setting. One study of weather forecasters-in-training (Jang et al., 2012) 
found a large difference concerning the time forecasters spent to complete a task on the computer 
(i.e., stacked displays) versus using a map wall (i.e., maps of meteorological information printed 
out and stuck on a 100” x 40” wall in a distributed display fashion). Even though students with 
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the map wall display could not use animations and map comparison/modeling tools commonly 
used to improve forecasting, they made predictions 40% faster (25 minutes) than those who used 
the single monitor computer display (40 minutes), with equal prediction accuracy. Given that 
rapid and accurate weather prediction is key for work and safety situations that depend upon 
weather forecasts, the difference is substantial. Interestingly, the study showed that the benefit of 
a sophisticated computer program based on years of research can be overcome by the 
consequence of moving to a smaller window size on how the information is spatially organized 
(distributed or stacked).  
The issue of distribution applies well beyond meteorology. In many sciences, a number 
of highly used statistics packages provide information primarily in a stacked display, which may 
broadly hinder work efficiency. For example, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) is the most widely used program for statistical analysis in social science and beyond 
(e.g., market researchers, health researchers, survey companies, government, education 
researchers, marketing organizations and others). The original SPSS manual (Nie, Bent, & Hull, 
1970) has been described as one of "sociology's most influential books" (Wellman, 1998). Yet, 
the program provides data tables and graphs in a serial and stacked manner, and it is not hard to 
meet a researcher who complains about the layout of the output window of SPSS. In the current 
research, the focus is specifically on real world science problem solving of this type (i.e., data 
interpretation using statistical information) as a subject matter. 
In addition to the practical value, this endeavor is theoretically meaningful as well due to 
the sparseness of studies that examined the role of visual displays on complex tasks. Most 
previous studies have focused on simple and well-defined tasks such as extracting specific 
values, comparing values, or detecting expected trends as the whole task. Although the simple 
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tasks have been very useful for cognitive scientists to characterize the cognitive processes of task 
performance with various visual displays and develop cognitive models (Carpenter & Shah, 
1998; Freedman & Shah, 2002; Shah & Freedman, 2011), as Thomas and Cook (2005) pointed 
out, these simple tasks are not the most interesting tasks in visual analytics. Real visual analytics 
work on ill-defined tasks that entail uncertainty and may require data exploration, or reasoning 
with thousands of data points scattered across multiple visualizations (Ratwani et al., 2008; 
Trafton et al., 2000; Trafton, Marshall, Mintz, & Trickett, 2002; Trickett, Trafton, Saner, & 
Schunn, 2007). 
Much of science is inherently a complex information integration task. Science work 
commonly consists of experimenting (whether via thought-experiment, simulation, or physical-
experiment), data gathering, analyzing, and interpreting. Due to the inter-dependency of these 
steps, integration across steps and data sources becomes a crucial and inherent part of science 
work. The design of an experiment changes the contents of the data that is gathered, and the way 
the data is analyzed influences data interpretation. Accurate interpretation requires information 
integration and comprehension across all the steps to draw a sound conclusion and plan a next 
meaningful experiment. When multiple experiments are examined (as is typically the case), 
detailed integration must take place across findings, but also to some extent across methods and 
measures. The step of data interpretation (within and across experiments), a crucial and highly 
integrative step in conducting science, was used as the focal task for the current research to 
examine the effect of displays in the context of science problem solving.  
Despite the integrative nature of science problem solving and the availability of large 
display technologies, many scientists often do not make full use of available screen space, and 
often still rely purely on small laptops that rarely are large enough to accommodate multiple 
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sources of data. For example, we observed this pattern of display use in an observational study 
(Jang & Schunn, 2008): Scientists from various disciplines were gathered to investigate the 
nature of water ice below the solid Martian northern arctic plain during the NASA Phoenix Mars 
’08 Mission. In this setting, all scientists were provided with a high-end computer with a large 
dual monitor set-up. However, these scientists used only one screen most of the time (63%), and 
81% of single-screen use involved a laptop. Here, factors other than display effectiveness likely 
drove screen use, and this observation argues for the importance of studying experts: are experts 
less subject to effects of information organization? 
To take up this issue of generality of effects across expertise levels, this research 
examined the effect of spatial organization of scientific information on professional scientists 
(i.e., experts rather than undergraduates). Many lab studies use simple tasks— easy enough that 
any untrained person could do—because it simplifies data collection (i.e., all possible individuals 
can participate and with little-to-no training time). Further, it is often assumed that samples of 
undergraduates are representative of humans more broadly. However, rather than typical, Jones 
(2010) characterized undergraduate samples that are usually studied as “WEIRDos”. That is, 
they are people from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic cultures,” and 
meta-analyses suggest that the findings from many psychology studies using only typical US 
undergraduates do not generalize to other populations. As a large segment of the US scientific 
workforce is not WEIRDos, this issue is particularly problematic for generalizing many existing 
lab studies on undergraduates to real-world science.  
A second generalization issue is the nature of the task. Many ‘science’ tasks used in 
psychology labs and science education research are far from what scientists actually do (Chinn & 
Malhotra, 2002), simply because the pool of undergraduates and young students available for 
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experimentation cannot do more typical science tasks. Further, undergraduates performing 
science tasks can be very different from scientists doing actual science tasks, just as beginning 
driver behaviors can be very different from racecar driver behaviors. As a result of these issues, 
the proposed research directly examines the effects of expertise.  
1.3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF INFORMATION PROCESSING AND 
EXPERTISE   
I consider three explanations for the distributed display time advantage: Do stacked displays 
make people into slow memorizers (information internalization cost), frequent page flippers 
(information access cost), or note-takers (information externalization cost)? Note that the effect 
of stacked displays is likely due to a combination of these three explanations. 
First, a stacked display may lead to getting lost, or at least more revisiting of information 
on the path to finding critical information. As demonstrated in Kroft and Wickens (2002), 
student pilots with the spatially stacked display produced significantly more toggles between the 
two information sources, compared to those that had integrative displays. Similarly, weather 
forecasters (Trafton, Trickett, Schunn, & Kirschenbaum, 2007) who worked with a 17-inch 
desktop revisited maps six times more often than those who had the map wall display (i.e., maps 
of meteorological information printed out and stuck on a 100” x 40” wall).  
Second, in stacked displays, activities such as using notes to keep track of information 
within and across pages and going back to certain pages may act as additional secondary tasks, 
even when the task itself is not a dual-task problem. Note taking might be the most commonly 
used strategy that problem solvers use to avoid information overload and to promote accuracy. 
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Using notepads has been found to help people solve scientific reasoning problems more 
accurately and facilitate self-explanation when learning (Trafton & Trickett, 2001). Likewise, 
stacked display users may frequently take and refer to notes to keep important information 
externalized.   
Third, people may choose to slow down and memorize information to keep it available in 
their heads rather than keep checking back. Gray and Fu (2004) have shown that people easily 
become memorizers when the necessary information is even just a click away. Unlike the other 
two explanations, the slow memorizer explanation provides insights at the level of the underlying 
cognitive mechanism (i.e., strategy selection depending on the degree of information access cost 
that a display imposes) and systematically influences the other two explanations (i.e., 
memorizers should turn pages and get lost less often than verifiers). The next paragraph presents 
data that supports the slow memorizer explanation and how this single explanation can be 
consistently applied to different studies. 
1.3.1 Information Access Cost and Memorization 
A recent eye-tracking study suggested that problem-solvers adopt an information 
memorization strategy in stacked conditions, and this memorization time could account for the 
stacked display time disadvantage (Jang et al., 2012). Eye tracking involves measuring the point 
of a gaze (called a fixation) and the length of time the gaze remains fixed on a location (called a 
fixation duration). Participants in the stacked display condition fixated significantly longer on 
information pieces on each page throughout an integrative problem-solving task than those who 
solved the same problem using the distributed display (see Figure 2), as a (possibly unconscious) 
strategy to bypass the relatively higher information access cost in the stacked display. That is, the 
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stacked display produces a situation with high information access costs because information is a 
page-turn away, compared to the cost of an eye/head turn in the distributed display. 
Consequently, problem-solvers chose to memorize information (by staring at each piece of 
information a little longer) rather than repeatedly turn pages to look for information. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average first pass fixation duration on information presented in distributed vs. stacked formats 
 
When the cost of accessing external information increases, people tend to memorize 
information to make it readily accessible in the head (i.e., memorization strategy; stacked 
display). By contrast, when information access cost is low, people do not bother to memorize 
information and instead rely on external/in the world information (i.e., perceptual-motor strategy; 
distributed display). In terms of performance accuracy, the memory strategy selection can be 
construed as an adaptive choice balancing accuracy and effort, because information in the world 
is accurate but that in the head may not be. For example, participants made more errors in a 
given task when they adopted the memorization strategy, but with a reduction in task time (Gray 
& Fu, 2004). While in science we would prefer that scientists not trade accuracy for speed, there 
will also be some tradeoff because the set of possible analyses is infinite and time is finite.  
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One may argue that the slow memorizer explanation goes against the student weather 
forecasters study (Jang et al., 2012) where people in the stacked display condition revisited pages 
far more frequently, which should not have occurred if they had memorized information. In fact, 
the eye-tracking study and the student weather forecaster study together demonstrate the power 
of the adaptive choice theory underlying the slow memorizer explanation. The slow memorizer 
explanation suggests that differing information access costs associated with information layout 
affect the probabilities of adopting different information encoding strategies. The stacked view 
display makes it harder to access information that needs to be integrated; one can compensate 
either by slowing down and memorizing information as observed in the eye-tracking study or by 
frequently going back and forth as in the weather study. The choice of strategy likely can be 
explained by relative access costs: hovering vs. clicking. People in the weather interface likely 
became verifiers because the interface made flipping maps very easy through hovering (simply 
holding the mouse over different areas changes the animation content immediately). By contrast, 
people in the eye-tracking study became memorizers, as they had to click and wait hundreds of 
milliseconds to access a content page. However, regardless of which strategy was used, the 
stacked display costs users a substantial amount of total problem solving time that could have 
been saved by using a distributed display.  
1.3.2 Expertise Effects and Expertise Reversals 
It is unknown whether the distributed display advantage phenomenon and the slow 
memorizer explanation of it would hold up in the case of experts. They may hold up in the expert 
case because the information access cost is a basic factor that affects all human information 
perception (i.e., low-level cognition). With extensive training and a vast amount of knowledge, 
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however, experts may overcome the costs in ways that non-experts cannot, such as with unique 
memorization strategies, data monitoring techniques and information search strategies (i.e., high-
level cognition).  
Likewise, information display research has been focused more on novices such as student 
pilots, electrician apprentices and trainees, or middle school students. What aids novices may not 
generalize to experts or may even slow experts. Several studies investigating the relationship 
between the level of domain knowledge and instructional design (Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 
1998; McNamara, Kintsch, Songer, & Kintsch, 1996; Yeung, Jin, & Sweller, 1998) suggested a 
so-called expertise reversal effect. That is, advanced learners (i.e., intermediate electricians) 
learned less when information was provided in integrated texts and diagrams and learned more 
from a diagram-only format (Kalyuga et al., 1998).  Separated displays produce an additional 
step of mental integration of information pieces for novices and are thus harmful, but for 
advanced learners, integrated displays provide redundant, distracting information that cannot be 
ignored and thus hinders learning. A similar reversal of what is best for experts vs. novices was 
reported in medical diagnoses. While residents performed well with verbal descriptions of 
dermatology lesions and photographs, professional dermatologists performed worst with verbal 
descriptions and best with a photograph alone (Kulatanga-Moruzi, Brooks, & Norman, 2004).  
Although similar predictions are seemingly possible for the case of distributed vs. stacked 
displays, it is unclear whether the expertise reversal effect would be also observed in our case. 
Unlike integrated displays, distributed displays always keep the multiple sources of information 
as separate entities. Thus, even though the sources may be placed close to each other, each 
source can be considered as a chunk and more easily disregarded when necessary. By contrast, 
the inhibition of redundant and distracting information is only one of the several routes that 
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could cause an expertise reversal effect. For example, expert chess players can carry out several 
games simultaneously without the view of the board and the pieces in a game called blindfolded 
chess. They can monitor, update, remember, and reconstruct chessboards of more than 50 moves 
in their head with only a 10% or less error rate (Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1997), and they are 
even able to generate best moves in given problem situations (Saariluoma & Kalakoski, 1998). 
These amazing abilities depend upon their eyes for search and predicting relevant moves and 
from abundant yet flexible scenarios established from their vast array of prior experiences.  
1.3.3 Summary 
To summarize, the three goals of the research were to: (1) examine the effect of 
information display (i.e., spatially distributed vs. stacked) in the context of a real science 
problem using data interpretation as a complex problem-solving task, (2) examine the effect of 
information display across populations differing in expertise, which would directly compare 
novices (i.e., undergrads) and experts (i.e., graduates and post-doctorates, and (3) build an 
empirically-based framework of the underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
To clarify how the multiple factors could operate together, I describe the underlying 
mechanisms in a diagram (see Figure 3) that is proposed in this study. In this framework, I 
examined the cognitive process of information integration in complex problem solving 
considering fundamental aspects of information processing that likely do not change with 
expertise and those more experience dependent aspects: how differing information access costs 
of the two information display formats affect the information encoding process (e.g., how 
experts’ performance is constrained by information displays) and how expertise affects 
information management strategies such as note-taking strategies in response to a given 
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information display (e.g., how experts use their skill sets and knowledge to effectively overcome 
the constraints an information display imposes). 
 
 
Figure 3. A framework of underlying mechanisms 
 
There are three types of cognitive costs in relation to information access efforts: 
information internalization cost (i.e., memorizing measured by first time fixations), information 
access cost (i.e., revisiting measured by returning fixations), and information externalization 
costs (i.e., note taking measured by off screen gazes). Systematic research on the composite 
effect of these factors has not been previously done. I propose that these factors would together 
explain task performance well, and expertise would moderate the underlying cognitive processes.  
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2.0  EXPERIMENT: NOVICES VS. EXPERTS 
2.1 METHOD 
Scientists from two different points on the expertise continuum (i.e., psychology undergraduates 
vs. psychology graduate students and post-docs) were given a data interpretation task in two 
display formats (i.e., distributed vs. stacked) and their performance was compared to examine 
possible moderation of expertise on the effects of display format on performance. Eye-tracking 
data was used to examine possible underlying mechanisms.  
2.1.1 Participants 
The novice group consisted of 70 psychology undergraduate students (35 female; age 
range 18-25) at the University of Pittsburgh participating for course credit; the students were 
primarily 3rd and 4th year students who had taken a number of psychology content courses 
already and had some coursework in psychology research methods. The expert group consisted 
of 38 psychology graduate students and two post-docs (32 female; age range 23-48) at the 
University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University participating for $25. 
To ensure that expert participants had relevant expertise in data analysis and 
interpretation, several expertise measures were examined. On average, expert participants were 
in their 4th year of a PhD program (SD = 2.2) and had 4.7 years of experience with behavioral 
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data (SD = 3.0) and 4.5 years of experience with ANOVA (SD = 2.9). Further, expert 
participants had a mean of 2.7 journal publications (SD = 3.9) and 2.8 additional non-journal 
publications (e.g., conference papers, SD = 3.0). Of these, a mean of 1.1 were first author 
publications (SD = 2.5), and 1.2 were papers published in the prior two years (SD = 1.2). That is, 
the participants typically had multiple years of successful research experience and were currently 
research active. 
Expert participants were randomly assigned to either display format, and there were no 
differences in the level of expertise between experts in each display condition (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Mean and SD of expertise measures within each display format condition 
 Stacked Distributed  
Measure M SD M SD p value 
Year in PhD program 4.2 2.4 3.9 2.2 .72 
Years of experience with Behavioral data 4.6 3.5 4.8 2.5 .79 
Years of experience with ANOVA 4.3 3.3 4.6 2.6 .75 
Number of journal publications 2.6 2.5 2.8 5.0 .87 
Number of non-journal publications 2.3 2.5 3.4 3.4 .26 
Number of first author publications 0.7 0.9 1.6 3.4 .28 
Number of publications in last 2 years 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.1 .79 
 
2.1.2 Design 
A 2x2 between-subject design was used. The independent variables were display format 
(distributed vs. stacked) and expertise level (novices vs. experts). In individual sessions, both the 
novices and experts solved a data interpretation problem using either a distributed or a stacked 
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display. The task was self-paced to measure efficiency as well as accuracy of problem solving 
using distributed vs. stacked displays. While novices and experts solve the task, problem solving 
time, page transition logs, and eye movements were recorded. A set of survey was collected at 
the end of the experiment. The dependent variables include problem-solving times (i.e., time on 
information window, time on question-answering, and total task time), task accuracy, number of 
page visits, and patterns of eye-movements. 
2.1.3 Materials 
2.1.3.1 Eye-tracker. 
Eye-movements were recorded with a Tobii 1750 remote eye-tracker. The 17” monitor’s 
screen resolution was 1280 x 1024. The system runs at a constant frame-rate of 50 Hz. The 
approximate distance between the screen and participant was 12”. 
2.1.3.2 Main task materials. 
The main task involved quantitative data interpretation, examining research hypotheses 
with quantitative data presented in tables and graphs, and drawing a plausible conclusion. The 
characteristic of quantitative data interpretation of particular relevance to manipulations of 
display format is its integrative nature. Data interpretation is an integrative task because it 
involves processing multiple pieces of information (e.g., dependent and independent variables; 
descriptive and inferential statistics) presented in various formats (e.g., text, tables, graphs, and 
diagrams) and combining the information into a single coherent story. It is also a complex task 
that requires critical thinking. For accurate data interpretation, one needs to understand how the 
research was conducted (e.g., knowing strengths and weaknesses of the design), examine 
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statistical information critically (e.g., thinking about which data support or contradict the tested 
hypotheses, which data are more convincing than others, and what additional analyses can be 
done), and make plausible inferences in relation to research hypotheses (e.g., drawing a 
conclusion regarding which hypothesis is supported based on available evidence and how other 
contradicting results can be explained in the frame of the chosen hypothesis).  
To avoid the complicating effects of domain specific knowledge across differing focal 
areas of expertise among the expert group (e.g., cognitive, developmental, clinical psychology, 
or neuroscience), the task materials were consist of phenomena that are understandable to a 
broad range of research psychologists (Schunn & Anderson, 1999). The topic and content of the 
data was selected from Psychological Science, a psychology journal that delivers brief research 
reports of broad interest, so as to make support comprehension and interest in the task in the 
novices. Real journal reports were used to maintain plausibility of the task for experts. The 
particular topic involved destination memory (e.g., remembering the person to whom one has 
given information) and source memory (e.g., remembering the person from whom one has 
received information), examining which memory is more fallible and why. The content of the 
task data was adapted from Gopie and MacLeod (2009), Koriat, Ben-Zur, and Druch (1991), and 
Marsh and Hicks (2002). 
The materials involved a brief description of the research topic, data from two studies 
that each provide evidence consistent with one hypothesis but contradict each other. A one-page 
paper handout motivated the general research questions and provided participants with 
definitions of key concepts such as destination and source memory. On the computer, 13 content 
pages were available: questions to be answered, study 1 intro, study 1 hypothesis, study 1 
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methods (1) and (2), study 1 results, study 2 intro, study 2 hypothesis, study 2 methods (1) and 
(2), study 2 results (1), (2), and (3).  
 
 
Figure 4. Layout of spatially distributed display in the current experiment 
 
In this study, the two formats of information displays were defined in the following 
manner. The distributed displays divided the 17-inch screen into four equal-sized spaces (see 
Figure 4). Each space had a drop-down menu with which participants could choose the 
information that was loaded into each space. This was the same set-up that was used in the prior 
eye-tracking study (Jang et al., 2012) except that this time, participants in the distributed display 
condition can manage each information window separately. Thus each participant determines 
 22 
which information page to view in which space, resulting in unfixed and user-dependent sets of 
information page combinations. 
By contrast, the stacked displays present every information page in the top-left one-
quarter of the 17-inch screen space, leaving the other three spaces blank. Thus, only one 
information page could be examined at a time in the staked displays, and information shown 
previously was replaced by the next chosen display. The current set-up of stacked and distributed 
display simulates the use of small vs. large screens while keeping screen resolution per se 
constant. In both display format conditions, the screen was initially populated with blank pages.  
2.1.3.3 Practice materials. 
A short and simple practice was developed to familiarize participants with the general 
procedure of the task. The topic of the practice was learning with diagrams (why and when 
having a diagram improves learning) and seven pages of information were provided. The content 
of practice data was adapted from Willows (1978). 
2.1.3.4 Surveys. 
Three surveys were developed: strategy, cognitive load, and demographic surveys.  First, 
the strategy survey consisted of questions regarding perceived information availability and 
explicit use of a memorization strategy (i.e., whether they tried to memorize information), and 
other possible strategies they may have used to solve the task. Responses were made on a typical 
five-level Likert scale ranging from ‘Disagree’ to ‘Agree’.  
Second, the cognitive load survey asked participants to rate perceived difficulty and the 
amount of mental effort invested on 9-point scales, ranging from very, very easy (1) to very, very 
difficult (9) and from very, very low mental effort (1) to very, very high mental effort (9). This 
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subjective rating scale has well-documented validity and reliability (Paas & van Merriënboer, 
1994). It was expected to show the differential load participants perceived with the two display 
formats. In our previous study, a higher cognitive load was reported for stacked displays (Jang et 
al., 2011).  
Lastly, a demographic survey was employed to gather background information on age 
and gender. For the expert group, additional items were included: PhD program within 
psychology, year in the program, years of experience with behavioral data, and years of 
experience with ANOVA (the type of data analysis presented in the main task). 
2.1.4 Procedure 
The experiment was done in individual sessions and the session consisted of three 
components: practice, task, and survey. Each participant was first seated at an eye-tracker (Tobii 
1750) with a chin rest. After a brief eye-calibration, participants performed a practice task in the 
stacked display format. Before the practice started, participants first read aloud a passage 
describing the topic of the practice problem and confirmed that they understood the topic (see 
Appendix A). Then they were given instructions on how to navigate information pages using a 
drop-down menu, what are the questions they need to solve, and that the information window 
will be available at all times. Also, they were instructed to let the experimenter know when they 
are done with information window and ready to compose the answer so that they can move to 
another workstation equipped with a keyboard. A blank letter-size paper was provided to each 
participant to take notes during the problem solving. Participants were asked to make sure that 
their chin is on the chin-rest while they examine information on the screen but were allowed to 
lean back while they take notes. After the instruction, participants were asked to try the practice 
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problem alone (see Appendix B). During the practice, they were allowed to ask questions either 
about the problem content and the procedure. For the practice task, participants were not actually 
asked to write their answers in order to keep the practice brief, but they were not given this 
instruction until they said they are done examining the information window. Once they notified 
the experimenter that they are ready to give their answers, they were guided to the task. 
The task (see Appendix D) was done in the same manner as the practice was conducted. 
Before the task, participants read aloud a passage describing the topic (see Appendix C) and then 
were informed that they would write the answers for real this time and the task would be harder 
than the practice. Those who participated in the distributed display condition were given 
additional instructions on how to use the distributed display; a sample distributed information 
window was shown to participants using the practice material. A new blank paper was provided 
for note taking. Unlike practice, participants were not allowed to ask questions about the task 
content. When they indicated that they are finished with information examination on the 
window, eye movement recording was stopped and saved. Then, on another workstation 
equipped with a keyboard, participants were provided with a new page that has two windows 
accessible via clicking tabs, one to type their answers under each question (see Appendix E) and 
the other to hold the information window. Also in a self-paced manner, participants composed 
their answers for each and every question. They were able to refer back to the information 
window and their notes as they write.  
The goal of the task was to compose short paragraphs for several key integrative 
questions: whether the hypothesis of the first study was confirmed and why, whether the 
hypothesis of the second study was confirmed and why, whether the two studies are congruent, 
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and how to reconcile the discrepancies if they are not congruent. The core process of problem 
solving for the data interpretation task is provided in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. A flow chart of problem solving process for the current data interpretation task. The IF-
THEN statements denote critical information that needs to be captured by problem solvers to achieve 
accurate data interpretation. This chart is provided solely for readers’ convenience; it was never shown to 
participants. 
 
After the task was done, participants completed the three surveys in the order of strategy 
(see Appendix F), cognitive load (see Appendix G), and demographic survey (see Appendix H). 
Expert participants were additionally asked to submit their curriculum vitae. Participants were 
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asked to use a given codename instead of a real name when completing task questions and 
surveys. 
2.2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Outliers were defined as instruction violation and total task time longer than two standard 
deviations from the mean, which could be signs of misunderstanding of the experiment, 
insufficient basic knowledge to solve the task, and very low task motivation. Six undergraduate 
participants in the novice group were excluded from analyses as outliers, which left 34 
participants in the distributed condition (24 females) and 30 in the stacked condition (19 
females). Due to eye-tracker malfunction, three additional undergraduates (two in distributed and 
one in stacked) were excluded from eye movement data analyses. There were two outliers in the 
expert group whose total task time was longer than two standard deviations from the mean, 
leaving 19 experts in each condition (15 females in each condition). 
2.2.1 Task Time and Accuracy 
Three time measures were available: time spent solving the practice problem (practice 
time), time spent processing information presented in a given window display (window time), 
and time spent composing answers while having the information window available on the second 
tab of a window (answering time). 
Expert participants in the two conditions did not differ in practice time, t (36) = 1.19, p =  
.24 but novice participants in the distributed condition took longer (M = 6.1 minutes, SD = 2.0) 
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to finish the practice task than participants in the stacked condition (M = 5.1 minutes, SD = 1.0), 
t (62) = -2.55, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.68. To control for general task speed differences across 
participants, 2x2 MANCOVA was used to test the effect of display format and expertise level on 
window time, answering time, and task accuracy, with practice time as a covariate. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 4. More detailed statistics are presented in Appendix I. 
 
Table 4. Mean (and standard deviations) window time, answering time, and task accuracy by display format 
and expertise level 
 Display format 
Expertise level Stacked Distributed 
Window time (minutes) 
Novice 13.6 (4.0) 19.2 (8.2) 
Expert 20.1 (9.3) 15.7 (4.5) 
Answering time (minutes) 
Novice 12.1 (5.3) 11.5 (4.8) 
Expert 17.5 (8.6) 17.1 (6.4) 
Task accuracy (percentages) 
Novice 40.0 (26.7) 27.2 (22.5) 
Expert 44.7 (35.9) 56.6 (28.7) 
 
The window time was not different by the display formats, F (1, 97) = 0.01, MSE = 0.14, 
p = .95, nor by the expertise level, F (1, 97) = 0.65, MSE = 21.23, p = .42. More importantly, 
however, there was a significant interaction effect, F (1, 97) = 6.55, MSE = 212.69, p < .01, η2 = 
0.06. As shown in Figure 6 (left), the benefit of display formats was differed by expertise level. 
Experts who used distributed display tended to finish examining information faster than experts 
who used stacked display (t (36) = 1.87, p = .07). But for novices, the effect was the opposite; 
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novices finished examining information faster when they used the stacked display than when 
they used the distributed display  (t (62) = -3.43, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.92).  
 
Figure 6. Mean (with SE bars) window time (left) and task accuracy (right) by display format and expertise 
level. 
 
The answering time was different by expertise level (see Table 4), F (1, 97) = 18.74, MSE 
= 704.10, p < .001, η2 = 0.16. On average, experts spent 5.5 minutes more composing their 
answer than novices did, presumably, from engaging in more thinking and generated more 
complete and accurate answers; accuracy effects are explored below. This general expert-related 
slowing held regardless of condition: there was neither an effect of display format, F (1, 97) = 
0.17, MSE = 6.47, p =  .68, nor an interaction effect, F (1, 97) = 0.02, MSE = 0.80, p =  .88 for 
answering time.  
Accuracy was scored according to the grading rubric presented in Table 5. A point was 
given to each statement that is similar to the answer key and the aggregated points were used as 
task accuracy. Note that these answers can only be generated from inferential and integrative 
thinking by making comparisons across pages of hypotheses, methods, and results sections. 
Statistics for task accuracy are provided in percentages. 
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Table 5. Grading rubric for the data interpretation task.  
Questions Examples of key answers 
Question 1:  
Was the hypothesis of Study 1 confirmed? If so, 
what are the evidences? If not, what are the 
evidences? Be specific. 
 
• Destination memory was better than source 
memory (more correct identification) 
• Source memory was worse than target memory 
Question 2:  
Was the hypothesis of Study 2 confirmed? If so, 
what are the evidences? If not, what are the 
evidences? Be specific. 
 
• Destination memory was worse than source 
memory (low correct recognition) 
• Source memory was better than target memory 
Question 3:  
Are the results of Study 1 and 2 congruent? If so, in 
what ways and if not, in what ways? 
 
• In Study 1, source memory was worse than 
destination memory but in Study 2, destination 
memory was worse than source memory 
Question 4:  
If you've answered that there was an inconsistency 
in the findings of the two studies, how would you 
reconcile the findings? In other words, what do you 
think could account for these inconsistent results? 
Propose at least one hypothesis about the results. 
 
• In Study 1, the participant makes a decision 
regarding the destination of the information, 
while in Study 2 the participant does not; the self-
generated information/actions might make 
destination memory superior under certain 
circumstances 
 
As expected, experts were more accurate (M = 50.7, SD = 32.6) than novices (M = 33.2, 
SD = 25.2), F (1, 97) = 8.89, MSE = 6917.48, p < .01, η2 = 0.08, confirming that experts did have 
more knowledge and skills than novices for the given task. There was no main effect of display 
format on task accuracy, F (1, 97) = 0.01, MSE = 4.13, p = .94. But, interestingly, there was an 
interaction effect, F (1, 97) = 4.23, MSE = 3289.26, p < .05, η2 = 0.04. Experts in the distributed 
display condition tended to be more accurate than experts in the stacked display condition, but 
novices in the distributed display condition tended to be less accurate than novices in the stacked 
display condition (see Figure 6 right).  
One could argue that there can be a speed/accuracy trade off since experts spent more 
time on composing answers than novices. However, it is unlikely because of the following 
reasons. Experts in the stacked display condition scored considerably low in the stacked 
condition, thus even though experts spent more time answering questions (regardless of the 
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display format) than novices, they did not necessarily score higher. In addition, experts in the 
distributed display condition scored higher than experts in the stacked display condition even 
though the two expert groups spent a similar amount of time answering questions.  
The observation that experts scored only slightly better than novices in the stacked 
display condition may bear two explanations. First, experts who participated in this study were 
graduate students in training, thus they may not necessarily possess far superior expertise than 
undergraduate majors. The finding that experts scored only about 50% on average in total across 
the display format conditions can also support this idea. Second, the stacked format might have 
limited the use of expertise by providing an overly simplified problem space. When considering 
how important it is to examine the big picture in scientific problem solving, compared to the 
distributed display format, the stacked display format may constrain even (near) experts in 
developing broad perspective.  
In sum, the results show very different effects of display format for experts than for 
novices: a complete expertise reversal for both time and accuracy. Specifically, a distributed 
display is beneficial for experts but a stacked display is beneficial for novices.   
In the following sections, three major contributing factors (i.e., internalization of 
information, external information access cost, and externalization of information) that might 
explain the differences in window time are analyzed. 
2.2.2 First Pass Fixation Durations: Internalization of information 
Generally, two eye movement measures (i.e., number of fixations and mean of fixation 
durations) are useful to test the memorization strategy hypothesis. The number of fixations 
directly shows how many times people fixated on information and the mean of fixations 
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demonstrates for how long people fixated on each information piece, thus the large number of 
fixations and the longer duration of mean fixations would mean more effortful encoding or 
memorization. Particularly, the mean of fixation durations was used in a previous study that 
successfully showed the memorization strategy effect in a stacked display format (Jang et al., 
2012). In the current study, however, the sum of fixation durations (i.e., a composite measure 
that reflects both the number of fixations and the average fixation durations; sum = number x 
average) was used because it was a measure at the appropriate level in order to effectively test 
the contributions across first pass fixations, return fixations, and off gaze durations.  
 To examine the possible role of a memorization strategy in producing the time 
differences between distributed vs. stacked displays, the sum of first pass fixation durations were 
computed by summing up the durations of fixations that laid upon each page during the first 
visit, excluding any regressions or returns. The sum of first pass fixation durations can be a direct 
measure of the memorization hypothesis, because each fixation duration serves as an on-line 
measure of information processing, similar to the eye-mind assumption and immediacy 
assumption used in eye-tracking studies of reading processes (Carpenter & Just, 1983). By 
examining the sum of first pass fixation durations, one can estimate to what extent a 
memorization strategy effect contributes to the total time differences observed on window time.  
Importantly, based on previous results using eye-tracking to study display format effects 
(Jang et al., 2012), longer first pass fixation durations in the stacked display condition were 
expected, which would be consistent with the adoption of a memorization strategy due to the 
relatively high information access cost of the stacked view display (i.e., having to search and 
click an index, which involves at least several hundred of milliseconds extra for each information 
page visit). That is, if problem solvers experience higher information access cost when using 
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stacked displays, they should try to overcome the cost by spending extra encoding time to 
facilitate later retrievals from memory (Morgan, Patrick, Waldron, King, & Patrick, 2009).  
Further, no interaction was expected between the display format and the expertise level 
under the assumption that the differential information access cost imposed by the display format 
is a physical constraint. The cost of information access was fixed by the display format (i.e., an 
eye or head turn away in distributed displays and a page-turn away in stacked displays) and thus 
cannot be modified through expertise, so stacked display users should choose an effortful 
information encoding strategy (i.e., memorization) to circumvent the extra access cost regardless 
of their expertise level.  
A 2x2 ANOVA was used to test the effect of the display format and the expertise level on 
the sum of first pass fixation durations. Detailed statistics are presented in Appendix J. As 
predicted, there was no main effect of expertise level, F (1, 95) = 1.03, MSE = 4.56, p = .31 and 
no interaction effect, F (1, 95) = 0.01, MSE = 0.04, p = .93. There was only a main effect of 
display format, F (1, 95) = 98.95, MSE = 438.97, p < .001, η2 = 0.51. Regardless of the expertise 
level, stacked display users more than tripled the time initially encoded information (M = 6.4 
minutes, SD = 2.5) than distributed display users did (M = 2.0 minutes, SD = 1.6), which 
supports the memorization strategy hypothesis. 
The memorization response to changing access costs should also be seen throughout the 
information pages of the task. To further whether the effect was throughout the task or localized 
to particular pages, the sum of first pass fixation durations was analyzed by information page 
(see Figure 7). As predicted by the memorization strategy hypothesis, both experts and novices 
in the stacked display condition showed much longer first pass fixation durations consistently 
across all 13 information pages.  
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Figure 7. Mean sum of first pass fixation durations by information page for each condition (with SE bars). 
 
To examine the relative extent to which the expertise and display formats might have 
affected the process, correlations of the profile across conditions were analyzed. By comparing 
the magnitudes of correlations between the same formats (stacked-stacked and distributed-
distributed) to those between the same expertise levels (novices-novices and experts-experts), 
one can infer whether or not information layout or background knowledge influences the 
performance profile more for novices and experts. The correlations of the profile across 
conditions showed a strong stacked-stacked correlation (r = .93, p < .001, n = 13) and a medium 
distributed-distributed correlation (r = .70, p < .01, n = 13), consistent with the interpretation that 
the stacked condition was more constraining on expertise effects. Interestingly, for novices, the 
effect was driven more by the display format than expertise (rather weak novice-novice 
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correlation compared to the strong stacked-stacked correlation: r = .75, p < .001, n = 13). But for 
experts, the effect was driven more by their knowledge-based reactions to the input than the 
display format (relatively strong expert-expert correlation compared to the medium distributed-
distributed correlation: r = .84, p < .001, n = 13). 
2.2.3 Return Fixation Durations: External information access cost 
The sum of return fixation durations was computed by subtracting the sum of first pass 
fixation durations from the sum of total fixation durations, which includes all regressions and 
returns. While measures of first pass fixations show how much time and effort problem solvers 
invested during the first time encoding in reaction to the relatively higher information access cost 
in the stacked display condition, return fixations provide an index of external information access 
cost. Note that total external information access cost involves planning returns, mouse 
movements, eye-saccades, in addition to the fixation duration of the return. Those other elements 
are harder to capturing from the eye data. Because those other elements are a multiple of the 
return fixations, I focus on the return fixations as the tip of the iceberg. In addition, from 
watching replays of the eye-data, it appears that the bulk of the time is spent on revisiting the 
information rather than getting back to the information (i.e., return fixations are the bulk of the 
external information access cost). 
If the distributed display produces relatively lower information access cost (i.e., an eye-
turn) than the stacked display, distributed display users should not bother to memorize 
information at first time encoding and therefore make more regressions and revisits. Thus, it was 
predicted that stacked display users would show shorter return fixation durations than distributed 
display users. Neither an effect of expertise level nor an interaction between the display format 
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and the expertise level were expected since the effect of return fixation durations relies on the 
physical constraint as the effect of first pass fixations does. 
A 2x2 ANOVA was used to test the effect of display format and expertise level on the 
sum of return fixation durations. Detailed statistics are presented in Appendix K. As predicted, 
there was no significant effect of expertise level on the sum of return fixation durations, F (1, 95) 
= 0.02, MSE = 0.15, p = .90 and no interaction effect, F (1, 95) = 1.41, MSE = 12.38, p = .24. 
There was only an effect of display format, F (1, 95) = 70.60, MSE = 620.04, p < .001, η2 = 0.43. 
Regardless of the expertise level, stacked display users re-accessed information for much less 
total time (M = 2.1 minutes, SD = 1.6) than distributed display users did (M = 7.4 minutes, SD = 
3.8), which is also consistent with a relatively higher information access cost in stacked display 
condition and further supports the memorization hypothesis as an explanation of the effects of 
display format.  
To further examine the relative localization of this effect across the task, the sum of 
return fixation durations was analyzed by information page (see Figure 8). Note that for the 
stacked display condition, these return fixations are purely revisit fixations (i.e., a now hidden 
prior page must be found and re-displayed); these revisits therefore show the pages participants 
were willing to revisit in spite of the relatively high information access cost. The correlations of 
the profile across conditions showed a strong stacked-stacked correlation (r = .88, p < .001, n = 
13) and a weak distributed-distributed correlation (r = .44, p = .14, n = 13). It appears that for 
both novices and experts, the effect was driven more by the display format than expertise (rather 
weak novice-novice correlation compared to the strong stacked-stacked correlation: r = .69, p < 
.01, n = 13 and expert-expert correlation: r = .67, p < .01, n = 13).  
 36 
Both novices and experts in the stacked display condition revisited and fixated longer on 
results, which seems plausible because results sections contain the most relevant information to 
evaluate whether the provided hypotheses were confirmed or not. Further, as expected in the 
previous section, the relatively longer return fixation durations in the distributed display 
condition were observed majorly in methods and results. Thus distributed display users 
examined critical information in methods and results sections by making returns but stacked 
display users did it by encoding well at first. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mean sum of return fixation durations by information page for each condition (with SE bars). 
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2.2.4 Off Screen Gaze Durations: Externalization of information  
Another large possible use of problem solving time involves note taking and note 
processing. Participants were able to take notes freely during the window examination phase and 
many of them (although not all of them) took notes and consult these notes while they composed 
answers. The regular use of notes implies a need for another form of (personally constructed) 
external storage for this complex task. In addition, since the action of note taking can entail 
multiple cognitive activities such as selecting information worthy of notes, summarizing, and 
sometimes writing elaborated ideas or inferences for later use, it can be a place for which 
expertise may play a particularly important role.  
The memorization strategy hypothesis predicts that stacked display users should have 
spent more time taking notes, essentially as an alternative form of (external) memorization. If 
people experience relatively higher information access cost when using stacked displays, they 
may take notes to reduce the need to revisit previous pages and thus to take advantage of 
cognitive offloading. However, note taking may be governed less by the physical constraints 
unlike first pass and return fixations because note taking happens at a relatively higher level of 
cognitive processing than basic information encoding and eye-movement programming. Experts 
who use distributed displays may make less use of notes because they can selectively and 
flexibly integrate and compare information across the four quadrants, but novices may feel that it 
is overwhelming to have information provided across the four spaces at once. Since novices are 
not skilled enough to manipulate technical and statistical information, too much information may 
hinder their understanding and the frustration may lead to use of notes as a way to externally 
reconstruct their own simplified problem space.  
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To test patterns in note-taking time, off-screen gaze durations longer than 2,000 ms were 
collected and summed up as a proxy measure of the time spent on note taking (i.e., sum of the 
time spent on various activities beyond online visual information processing). In general, off-
screen gaze durations longer than the normal blink duration of 300-400 ms could have been used 
as an index of time users are engaged in other activitieswhich was most commonly note taking 
in this study. But a more conservative threshold of 2,000 ms was used to reduce the effect of 
activities other than note taking (e.g. looking at a computer clock to check the time, looks to the 
mouse after a hand was taken off of them, or head scratches).  I use the term note taking to refer 
to both the writing of new notes, and the mental processing of existing notes. 
A 2x2 ANOVA was used to test the effect of display format and expertise level on the 
sum of off-screen gaze durations longer than 2,000 milliseconds. Detailed statistics are presented 
in Appendix L. There was no main effect of expertise level, F (1, 95) = 1.20, MSE = 16.47, p = 
.28, or display format, F (1, 95) = 0.05, MSE = 0.63, p = .83 on the sum of off-screen gaze 
durations. Interestingly, there was a significant interaction effect, F (1, 95) = 12.59, MSE = 
173.38, p < .001, η2 = 0.12 (see Figure 9). Experts who used the stacked display spent twice as 
much time on note taking as those who used the distributed display (t (36) = 2.12, p < .05, 
Cohen’s d = 0.76), as the memorization hypothesis predicted. But novices showed a reverse 
pattern: novices who used the stacked display spent less one third the time on note taking than 
did those who used the distributed display (t (59) = -2.95, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.82).  
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Figure 9. Mean (with SE bars) off screen gaze durations (left) and amount of notes (right) by display format 
and expertise level. 
 
One may wonder whether it is plausible to consider the off-screen gaze durations longer 
than 2,000 ms a reliable estimate for the amount of notes taken. To test the idea, the amount of 
notes for each participant was coded on a four-point scale: little (only a couple of lines), light (5-
10 lines), medium (10-20 lines), and heavy notes. The Pearson correlation at the participant level 
between the total off-gaze durations and the amount of notes was r = .70, n = 99, p < .001. 
Further, the 2x2 ANOVA on the amount of notes showed exactly the same pattern that was 
observed in the off-screen gaze duration (see Figure 9). There was neither an effect of expertise, 
F (1, 95) = 1.64, MSE = 2.59, p = .20, nor an effect of display format, F (1, 95) = 0.14, MSE = 
0.22, p = .71, but the interaction was significant, F (1, 95) = 7.87, MSE = 12.43, p < .01, η2 = 
0.08.  
The results are consistent with the prediction that note taking time is a measure more 
heavily influenced by expertise than the two previous eye-tracking-based measures. It seems that 
experts in the stacked display took more notes as it was relatively harder to access information 
and they used notes to store necessary information in a readily available place, as the 
memorization strategy hypothesis would predict. However, novices in the distributed condition 
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took more notes even when multiple information pages were available at once. It may imply that 
the difficulties novices experienced with a potentially overwhelming amount of information and 
the lack of expertise might have overridden the effect of the display format.  
 
 
Figure 10. Mean off-screen gaze durations by information page in each condition. 
 
To investigate further on which page problem solvers spent more time engaging with 
notes, off-screen gaze durations were analyzed by information page (see Figure 10). Overall, 
participants seemed to spend more time on note taking while processing methods and results 
pages. Also, as the interaction effect between the display format and the expertise level predicts, 
experts took more notes when they were using the stacked display and the trend seems consistent 
across the pages, but novices took more notes when they were using the distributed display and 
the effect shows a couple of peaks on Questions, Study2 Hypotheses, and Study2 Methods (2). It 
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is rather odd to observe these peaks but it could have been caused by differences in expertise, 
because it might have been harder for novices to understand hypotheses, methods, and even the 
questions. 
The correlations of the profile across conditions showed a medium stacked-stacked 
correlation (r = .66, p < .01, n = 13) and a weak distributed-distributed correlation (r = .46, p = 
.11, n = 13). It appears that for both novices and experts, the effect was driven more by the 
display format than expertise (very weak novice-novice correlation: r = .33, p = .27, n = 13 and 
expert-expert correlation: r = .10, p = .76, n = 13). 
In addition, it seemed that the time effect mainly came from the quantity of notes rather 
than the quality. Two qualitative measures were analyzed to see if experts had written more 
integrative and goal-related notes. As for an integrative note taking, the number of connections 
made among information from different pages was counted. When contents from different pages 
were explicitly connected by arrows or written in close proximity, each instance was counted. In 
general, not so many connections were made. On average, novices made 0.17 (SD = 0.50) 
connections and experts made 0.53 (SD = 0.72) connections but there was a significant main 
effect of expertise (F (1, 76) = 7.42, MSE = 2.53, p < .01, η2 = 0.09). Experts seem to take a bit 
more integrative notes but the frequency was fairly low. Interestingly, there was a tendency that 
novices who used distributed display took more integrative notes (distributed: M = 0.22, SD = 
0.58, stacked: M = 0.10, SD = 0.30) while experts who used stacked display took more 
integrative note (distributed: M = 0.40, SD = 0.63, stacked: M = 0.65, SD = 0.79). However, the 
interaction effect was not significant, F (1, 76) = 1.95, MSE = 0.67, p = .17, η2 = 0.03. To 
measure goal-related note taking, the number of written inferences and conclusions was counted. 
Inferences and conclusions defined as comments that deliver problem solvers’ idea, opinion, 
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analyses, and attempt answers for the task questions. There was no effect either by expertise (F 
(1, 76) = 1.00, MSE = 3.81, p = .32) or display format (F (1, 76) = 0.76, MSE = 2.91, p = .39). 
Also, there was no interaction effect, F (1, 76) = 1.14, MSE = 4.33, p = .29. Detailed statistics are 
presented in Appendix M. 
2.2.5 Self-Reported Strategies and Cognitive Loads 
Strategy and cognitive load survey results showed several patterns that supports previous 
findings. Detailed statistics are presented in Appendix N. First, novices reported relatively lower 
expertise on the data interpretation task. In the strategy survey (see Figure 11), regardless of 
display format they used, novices felt more lost about where they were in the task (M = 1.8, SD = 
1.1) than experts reported (M = 1.4, SD = 0.9), F (1, 98) = 4.09, MSE = 4.32, p < .05, η2 = 0.04, 
which suggests their unfamiliarity to the data interpretation task and low expertise. It was also 
found that the invested mental effort (see Figure 12) in understanding theory was larger for 
novices than experts, F (1, 98) = 6.76, MSE = 17.34, p < .01, η2 = 0.07 and the perceived 
difficulty in understanding the results was higher for novices than experts, F (1, 98) = 8.17, MSE 
= 23.34, p < .01, η2 = 0.08. More specifically, novices reported lack of skills in integrating 
information. They not only reported higher perceived difficulty in integrating methods and 
results, F (1, 98) = 6.65, MSE = 18.91, p < .01, η2 = 0.06, but also reported that they invested 
more mental effort to integrate methods and results, F (1, 98) = 9.48, MSE = 28.84, p < .001, η2 
= 0.09. 
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Figure 11. Mean rating on the strategy survey by expertise 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean rating of perceived difficulty by expertise 
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Second, both experts and novices reported difficulty using the stacked display window, 
which supports the idea that people experience relatively higher information access cost in the 
stacked display, regardless of expertise. In the strategy survey (see Figure 13), for a question 
asking if they felt that all the information from different page blurred, stacked display users in 
both expertise group agreed significantly more than distributed display users did, F (1, 98) = 
4.51, MSE = 4.24, p < .05, η2 = 0.04, which may imply information overload in the head as a side 
effect of using memorization strategy. In the cognitive load survey (see Figure 14), both experts 
and novices who used the stacked display reported higher perceived difficulty in using the 
window design than those who used the distributed display, F (1, 98) = 23.11, MSE = 61.56, p < 
.001, η2 = 0.19, and reported that they invested more mental effort in using the stacked display, F 
(1, 98) = 18.22, MSE = 49.96, p < .001, η2 = 0.16.   
 
 
Figure 13. Mean rating on the strategy survey by display format 
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Figure 14. Mean rating of perceived difficulty by display format 
 
Finally, some measures showed interaction effects between display format and expertise 
that matched to the findings in the previous sections (see Figure 15). In the strategy survey, for a 
question asking to what degree they had trouble remembering information and had to look back, 
novices agreed with the statement more when they were using the distributed display, but experts 
agreed more when using the stacked display, F (1, 98) = 4.12, MSE = 4.23, p < .05, η2 = 0.04. 
Further, in the cognitive load survey, novices in the distributed display condition perceived the 
task more difficult than novices in the stacked display condition while experts perceived the task 
easier when the task was provided in the distributed display, F (1, 98) = 7.90, MSE = 16.35, p < 
.01, η2 = 0.08. And the same pattern was observed in the reported amount of mental effort they 
invested to solve the task, F (1, 98) = 14.91, MSE = 29.92, p < .001, η2 = 0.13.  
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Figure 15. Mean ratings by display format and expertise for a strategy survey question (left) asking how 
much people agree that they had trouble remembering information and had to look back, perceived difficulty 
of task itself (middle), and mental effort invested to solve the task (right). 
2.2.6 Integrating the Effects of the Three Main Time Elements 
The difference observed in the total window-examining time can be explained by the 
interplay of effects on the three different main times examined thus far: time spent on first pass 
fixations, time spent on return fixations, and time spent on note taking. There were no 
correlations above 0.14 between the three factors.  
 
 
Figure 16. First pass and return fixation durations and note taking time by display format for experts (left) 
and for novices (right) 
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First, as the memorization hypothesis predicted, problem solvers spent more time on first 
time encoding and less time on return fixations with stacked displays, and this pattern was found 
true regardless of expertise (see Figure 16). That is, the stacked display produced more 
information internalization due to its higher information access cost. Note that a similar pattern 
could be observed when analyzing the number of first pass and return fixations, rather than 
fixation durations. Across both levels of expertise, stacked display users made more first pass 
fixations and fewer return fixations while distributed display users showed exactly the reverse 
pattern (number of first pass fixations: F (1, 95) = 128.57, MSE = 22,835,437, p < .001, η2 = 0.58 
and number of return fixations: F (1, 95) = 85.94, MSE = 32,952,317, p < .001, η2 = 0.48). 
Similarly, analyses of page transition frequency (i.e., a fixation-based measure including page-
turning action: how many times participants moved their eyes to different pages) showed that 
both experts and novices in the stacked display condition made far fewer page transitions (M = 
22.3, SD = 6.2) than those in the distributed display condition (M = 153.3 SD = 70.6), F (1, 95) = 
148.75, MSE = 391,427, p < .001, η2 = 0.61. Detailed statistics are presented in Appendix O. 
Second, note taking was found to be interactively affected by display format and 
expertise. Unlike the first two factors that were directly governed by the physical constraint and 
thus showed the same pattern of effect across the two expertise level, the analyses of note taking 
time and amount showed that experts took more notes when they were using the stacked display 
but novices took more notes when using the distributed display. Given the knowledge and skills 
that experts have, it could have been beneficial for experts to have four pages of information laid 
side by side so that they can compare and integrate information across hypotheses, methods, and 
results. The stacked display, in contrast, might have hindered experts because the limited 
availability of information could not support the fast flow of thoughts. In a reaction to avoid 
 48 
discrete information availability in the stacked display, experts seemed to take more notes so as 
to externalize the necessary information in a handy place. However, due to the lack of 
knowledge and experience, novices might have felt overwhelmed by having too much 
information available in the distributed display, not knowing where to focus. The larger amount 
of note taking observed in the distributed condition may be the result of this frustration and an 
effort to reorganize their thoughts by copying the information in a new format. Thus, it could 
have been actually easier for novices to have each information page displayed separately and 
digested in a more step-by-step manner.  
Finally, taken altogether, the overall difference observed in the window examining time 
can be explained by the combined contribution of the three factors (see Table 6). The time 
difference between stacked and distributed displays observed in each factor was computed and 
summed up, then compared to the time differences observed in the window time. For novices, 
the mean window time difference was 13.6 - 19.2 = -5.6 minutes, and the three factors explained 
70% of this time difference. For experts, the mean window time difference was 20.1 - 15.7 = 4.4 
minutes, and 64% of this time difference was explained by the three factors.  
 
Table 6. Mean time differences in first pass fixation durations, return fixation durations, and note taking time 
(in seconds). Sum of the effect of the three factors is computed for novices and experts. 
 Novice  Expert 
 Stacked Distributed 
Stacked – 
Distributed 
 Stacked Distributed 
Stacked – 
Distributed 
First pass 
fixations  
6.2 1.8 4.4  6.6 2.3 4.3 
Return 
fixations  
1.9 7.7 -5.8  2.5 6.9 -4.4 
Note taking  1.7 4.2 -2.5  5.2 2.3 2.9 
Sum 9.8 13.7 -3.9  14.3 11.5 2.8 
 
 49 
About a minute and half was left unexplained in both groups. Given that the note taking 
time computed only by off screen gaze durations longer than 2,000 ms, the unexplained time 
may include time spent on multi-tasking other than note taking such as information tracking and 
even some eye blinking when people make fixation jumps within/between pages. In addition, 
information-loading time (i.e., time required to load and view an information page whenever a 
selection is made) was not accounted for the equation.  
The number of physical page transitions (i.e., page-turning action only: how many times 
participants selected and changed information page to view using the drop down menu) showed 
that both experts and novices made more page transitions in the stacked display condition (M = 
22.8, SD = 6.5) than when they were in the distributed display condition (M = 19.7, SD = 6.4), F 
(1, 98) = 8.14, MSE = 323.02, p < .01, η2 = 0.08 and this tendency was stronger for experts 
(Stacked: M = 25.7, SD = 6.6 vs. Distributed: M = 19.4, SD = 5.7) than novices (Stacked: M = 
20.9, SD = 5.8 vs. Distributed: M = 19.9, SD = 6.9), F (1, 98) = 4.16, MSE = 164.98, p < .05, η2 
= 0.04. Presumably, people in the distributed display condition did not have to turn pages so 
frequently once they made available the four information pages they needed. They could simply 
move their eyes to access information presented in the four quadrants. People in the stacked 
condition, however, had to turn pages if they wanted to look at information in another page and 
they seemingly turned more pages than people in the distributed display condition, as the task 
requires deep thinking and integration. But they were reluctant enough not to turn the pages four 
times more than the number of page turned in the distributed display condition; in fact, much less.  
The relatively stronger tendency in experts may imply that experts were more prudent 
and made more page transitions to check information even if it was bothersome in the stacked 
display condition. More interestingly, experts in the stacked display condition might have made 
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more page transitions because they wanted to integrate information across pages and the only 
way that they can achieve the goal was to go back and forth even though it was cumbersome; 
likewise, the physical page transition time can explain a portion of the unexplained time for 
experts. For novices, whether having a distributed display or not may not matter much (or even 
worse to have a distributed display) since they are not sufficiently trained to readily make 
connections across information in different sections. But for experts, having a distributed display 
does matter because it helps them cross-examine and integrate information across pages, which 
is the most crucial part of the successful problem solving for a data interpretation task.  
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3.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
3.1 DISTRIBUTED VS. STACKED DISPLAYS 
Replicating a numbers of prior studies with artificial tasks (Jang & Schunn, 2012; Jang et al., 
2011) and a couple of studies with authentic tasks (Jang et al., 2012; Kroft & Wickens, 2002), 
the current work again finds that the organization dimension of distributed versus stacked 
displays can have a large effect on problem solving performance. The current study carefully 
controlled display content to manipulate display format per se, now establishing that even with 
careful controls, the dimension matters even with rich, diverse tasks and with participants who 
are well trained in the task. Thus, I have increased confidence that this dimension is important in 
applied settings. As a result, the trends towards using micro-displays for work applications 
(powerful ultra-light laptops and tablet computers) should be re-examined carefully with respect 
to impact on performance. Further, it is recommended for optimizing software to better enable 
information distribution on the screen. 
3.2 EFFECT REVERSAL AND EXPERTISE (DOUBLE) REVERSAL 
Prior research on the distributed vs. integrated spatial arrangement effect found an expertise 
reversals such that experts actually benefit more from what would be worse for novices 
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(Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003). Studies on other factors impacting task 
performance (Cho, 2004; Yeung et al., 1998) also showed what is the best for experts may not do 
the same for novices. Therefore, a primary goal of the current study was to examine whether the 
benefit of distributed over stacked displays held for experts. Regarding this goal, the study did 
reveal a robust interaction between spatial arrangement and expertise. However, details of this 
expertise interaction were superficially quite surprising. Compared to previous studies (Jang & 
Schunn, 2012; Jang et al., 2011; Jang et al., 2012) that showed consistent task completion time 
benefits of distributed displays with relatively untrained participants, the current study actually 
found the opposite overall task completion time effect for novices. And then the display effect on 
task completion time for experts in this study did reverse what was found for novices on the 
same task, but back to what was previously found with novices on other tasks. 
The opposite task time effect can be explained by the differences in tasks. In previous lab 
tasks, individuals were able to be experts for the given tasks with a brief practice before the main 
task began because there was a relatively simple set of procedures and well-taught integration 
strategies to follow. Unlike previous lab tasks, this time novices working on an ill-defined 
problem that was quite difficult given their domain-specific and domain-general knowledge. 
Presumably, novices might have experienced two types of difficulty such that they do not know 
how to digest the content itself and how to integrate information across pages, if they even 
realized that integration is crucial to the problem solving.  
Further, the current stacked better than distributed effect on overall time with novices 
working scientific data analysis tasks does have some prior basis, albeit in preference rather than 
performance data. In a previous study of student format preferences (Jang & Schunn, 2011), 
psychology lab undergraduates were trained on statistical analysis procedures for a couple of 
 53 
weeks and then asked to choose and use either distributed or stacked format of statistic 
instructions to analyze a data on their own. About 70% of students chose the stacked format of 
instruction, which was a surprising overall ratio given that the distributed format had previously 
produced more efficient problem solving and greater learning outcomes (Jang et al., 2011). 
However, the current study suggests that the preference for stacked format of instructions among 
undergraduates may have been an adaptive choice for their level of expertise. Even though 
students were trained on the domain knowledge for a few weeks, the time and experience might 
have been short for them to confidently choose and use distributed information.   
I argue that the reversed novice pattern and then double reversal for experts found in the 
current study is only superficially surprising. Using the theoretical decomposition of factors 
influenced by distributed versus stacked displays that was introduced in this paper, it is possible 
to show how the pattern of effects across past and current results can be understood. The eye-
tracking data provides more direct access to the multiple factors that are in play, and this new 
level of theoretical precision and methodology for tracking underlying factors should enable 
more robust theorizing and application in various other domains. In the next section, I unpack 
aspects of expertise that need to be considered in our theoretical account, and then I discuss the 
larger underlying theory in the section after that. 
3.3 UNPACKING EXPERTISE EFFECTS 
Several expertise characteristics are relevant to the current study. It is important to note that 
graduate students participated in the current study are perhaps best called near-experts. Although 
the psychology graduates had 5 years of experience on average and most of them had first-
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authored journal publications, which clearly distinguishes them from novices, they did not meet 
the commonly used 10-year rule (Hayes, 1985) definition of world-class expertise. But expertise 
is really a continuous dimension that just a binary expert/novice distinction (Schunn, Saner, 
Kirschenbaum, Trafton, & Littleton, 2007), and for practical applications, it is important to 
understand effects along the broader continuum, especially since more people sit in the middle 
than at the end points. At the same time, the literature on expertise has focused on end points, 
and here I discuss two relevant expert behaviors, specifically regarding information search 
strategy and information representation.  
First, experts selectively access relevant information. Expertise involves learning and 
developing an eye for information value and probability: where to look and where not to look 
(Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Hinsley, Hayes, & Simon, 1977; Patel & Groen, 1991; Spilich, 
Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979). With the same basic limited cognitive capacity shared across 
all humans, experts become more efficient by attending to and consuming the types of 
information that provide high information value and are essential to problem solving. The 
graduate students in our study appeared better able than the undergraduates to manage and 
selectively view the information they needed to integrate among the multiple sources of 
information that consisted of graphs, tables and texts. Further, the trained graduate student eyes 
presumably focused less on tangential information within and across pages, thereby reducing 
cognitive load.  
Second, experts are often found to have functional, abstracted representations of 
presented information (Moss, Kotovsky, & Cagan, 2006). For example, expert physicists 
grouped physics problems according to which principles and equations are useful for solution, 
whereas novices grouped problems according to similarities in superficial features (Chi et al., 
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1981). Similarly, when asked to recall half-innings from a baseball game, ardent baseball fans 
structured the game by major goal-related sequences of the game, such as advancing runners, 
scoring runs, and preventing scoring, rather than the less essential components (e.g., weather or 
crowd mood) that novices often used in recall (Spilich et al., 1979). Based on these observations, 
the graduate students in the current study should have benefited from building a structured 
representation of the data interpretation problem, which in the current study can be indexed by 
note-taking behaviors⎯“task reflection as participants attend to problems” (Chi, 2006, p. 176). 
The content of the graduate students’ notes showed a tendency to be more integrative and goal-
related (e.g., writing key information, ideas instead of verbatim, new inferences, and connections 
among information from different pages with arrows or by writing them in close proximity), 
compared to a sequential list of exactly copied information that was shown often in the notes of 
novices. However, the expertise effect on note content was not large presumably because 
graduate students were not very far down the expertise continuum from the undergraduates. 
It may seem odd that the graduate students did not appear to benefit in this task from the well 
documented chunking benefits associated with expertise (Chase & Simon, 1973). However, it is 
important to note the current task was not only integrative but also relatively ill defined. 
Although the graduate students were trained on relevant analytic scenarios and schemata, ill-
defined tasks such as data interpretation of scientific studies in a new domain will have few 
familiar chunks to re-use. It is likely that analysis of data in their own focal areas of expertise 
would have presented the opportunity to use familiar chunks (Schunn & Anderson, 1999). 
 56 
3.4 UNPACKING THE UNDERLYING MECHANISMS OF DISPLAY 
ORGANIZATION EFFECTS 
The overall task time effects of display organization needs to be understood as the summation of 
three different underlying factors that influence task time: information internalization time, 
information access time, and information externalization time (see Figure 3).  
Stacked displays lead to higher information internalization time. This effect is indexed by 
mean fixation times during first pass through content, and it appears to hold for both novices and 
experts. Other researchers (Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006) have 
conceptualized this effect as a memorization micro-strategy that is automatically applied when 
there are relatively high external information access costs, like in the case of stacked displays.  
At the same time, in complementary fashion, stacked displays actually lead to lower 
information access times for both novices and experts, as indexed by shorter total return 
fixations. As a result of not having memorized the information, problem solvers using the 
distributed display must then more often search external for information to integrate, whereas the 
problem solvers using the stacked displays can rely on internally stored information, which will 
typically (although not always) be accessed more quickly than external information. It is 
important to note however, that the information internalization effect is larger than the 
information access effect, and thus, on the basis of just these two effects, there should generally 
be an overall time benefit of distributed displays over stacked displays. However, in the case of 
particularly complex integrative tasks that require constant revisiting, it could be that the stacked 
displays will be more beneficial because of the high frequency of revisiting previously 
memorized (or not) information. 
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The third effect, informational externalization time appears to be modulated by expertise 
level, but this is likely expertise level relative to the complexity of the task. In very simple tasks 
(such as what was studied previously), or for more expert problem solvers in more complex 
tasks, problem solvers take more notes with stacked displays, probably as an effort to manually 
make the information distributed and reduce the need to re-access information. In some ways, 
this effect could also be seen as an adaptive tradeoff between externalization time and 
information access time. By contrast, novices given a complex task took more notes in the 
distributed displays condition. These additional notes may have been taken to compensate for the 
cognitive overload from being presented so much difficult to integrate information: the 
additional notes constitute an attempt at creating a simplified information space. Novices in the 
distributed display condition did report higher cognitive load (perceived difficulty and mental 
effort). Alternatively, the novices may have taken fewer notes in the stacked display case 
because they saw less information that needed to be integrated; that is, they were less aware of 
the complexity of the integration task at hand. Indeed, other research has found that 
undergraduates often fail to even recognize the need for experimental data to be integrated with 
an overarching theory (Schunn & Anderson, 1999, 2001). 
3.5 IMPLICATIONS 
The research has several implications for the field of cognitive psychology, human factors, and 
education. This study examined an ill-defined task, which is much more common in the work 
place than studied by researchers. Further, it specifically examines a kind of task that is common 
across most domains of science. That is, the basic skill sets required for accurate quantitative 
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data interpretation are common to a range of social sciences and human science fields, such as 
medicine, public health, marketing, economics, political science, and sociology. Further, there 
are important commonalities to quantitative data analysis in the natural sciences and engineering. 
Also, this study is relatively rare in directly comparing (more) expert and (more) novice problem 
solvers, and it showed a clear expertise reversal effect that is important to consider in proscribing 
implications for visual display use and design, and for the development of educational materials 
and strategies. For more expert problem solvers, the overall trend toward using smaller displays 
appears to be counterproductive to problem solving performance, whereas for more novice 
learners working on complex material, their use of laptops and tablets that naturally limit the 
amount of information displayed may be adaptive. 
In terms of theoretical implications, the study generated an understanding of the complex 
relationships between cognitive load, reasoning processes, and problem-solving performance 
from students to professionals. The proposed tripartite framework regarding underlying 
mechanisms was found to be useful for explain the time differences and it is expected to be 
applicable to further unpack the effects of other display type comparisons (e.g., stacked vs. 
integrated displays or collaborative information sharing systems). The underlying framework 
includes factors at the lower, perceptual level, but also high-level cognitive processes, and the 
overall model considers the bi-directional interaction between the information presentation 
environment (e.g., innate high information access cost in stacked displays) and the human’s 
activities (e.g., strategic information encoding and note taking).  
The proposed research also leads to practical suggestions for improvements to statistical 
analysis and data visualization software tools. For example, data output displays typically used 
by scientists can be improved in a way that better supports users’ data comprehension and 
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interpretation. Many students and colleagues are dissatisfied with the data visualization of 
statistical analysis software, which tend to show tables and graphs in a sequential and stacked 
manner. Even when people try to print out data and set up their own versions of a distributed 
display (e.g., spread the pages out on a table), often the tables and graphs do not print correctly 
or take too many pages to be printed. Considering the large number of users of data analysis 
software, including students, businessmen, scientists, and policymakers, data visualizations that 
better facilitates comprehension and problem solving could have a broad overall impact. 
3.6 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This research suggests that spatially distributed information lead experts to more efficient and 
effective problem solving. For future studies, boundary conditions of the effect (e.g., expertise 
and distribution ratio) should be explored to deepen our understanding of cognitive mechanisms 
and to provide precise recommendations for designers. For example, is there a benefit of 
distributing information across two large monitors rather than just two large monitors? Or does 
the distributed benefit hold for 20-year experts working on data in their own focal area of 
expertise? At the other end of the expertise continuum, given that novices in this study could not 
benefit from distributed displays, a question is remaining on how much expertise is required to 
benefit from distributed displays. Relevant subquestions include whether it requires domain-
specific, domain-general knowledge or a combination of both and how individual differences in 
cognitive abilities and strategy adaptivity would affect the information encoding strategy. As 
Schunn and Reder (2001) found, some people are much less sensitive and slow to change their 
strategy choices. 
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APPENDIX A 
TOPIC PASSAGE FOR PRACTICE 
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PLEASE READ OUT LOUD ONCE, AND READ IT OVER UNTIL YOU CAN 
PARAPHRASE THE HYPOTHESIS IN YOUR OWN WORDS BECAUSE YOU WILL BE 
ASKED TO DO SO 
 
Effect of Diagram on Learning 
 
There is a Chinese saying that a picture is worth 10,000 words. Like many bits of 
common wisdom, it turns out this is sometimes true. The task for cognitive psychologists is to 
figure when it is true and when it is not true. 
 
A lot of that previous work has been done on the effect of having pictures and diagrams 
and found significant benefits. For example, college students were found to learn better when a 
science text is accompanied with a relevant diagram.  
 
Willows (2005) recently conducted two studies to examine the effect of diagram on 
children’s learning (i.e., information recall and speed and accuracy of reading).  
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Pictures would facilitate recall of information. 
H2: Pictures would improve the speed and accuracy of reading. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YOU WILL BE PROVIDED WITH WILLOWS’S HYPOTHESES, METHODS, AND 
RESULTS. YOUR TASK IS TO INTERPRET THE RESULTS IN ORDER TO ANSWER 
GIVEN QUESTIONS. 
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APPENDIX B 
MATERIALS FOR PRACTICE 
 
Note: For readers’ convenience, page titles are placed at the top in bold and the end of each 
information page marked as “(Page Ends)” in bold. In the experiment, the titles were shown in a 
drop-down menu and “(Page Ends)” were not shown for participants. 
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Questions 
You will be asked to type your answers for these questions once you said you are done 
interpreting the results and ready to give your answers. You can refer back to your notes and task 
window while answering. 
1. Was the hypothesis of Study 1 confirmed? If so, what are the evidence? If not, what are 
the evidence? 
2. Was the hypothesis of Study 2 confirmed? If so, what are the evidence? If not, what are 
the evidence? 
3. Are results of Study 1 and 2 congruent? If so, in what ways and if not, in what ways? 
4. If you've answered that there was an inconsistency in the findings of the two studies, 
How would you reconcile the findings? 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 1: Intro & Hypothesis 
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the effect of pictures on the recall of expository prose 
by 1st graders.  
H1: Pictures would facilitate recall of information. 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 1: Methods 
Thirty-three first graders were presented with information about unusual animals in one of two 
conditions.  
 Description condition: children listened to descriptions of the animals 
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Description plus picture condition: children listened to a description while they looked at a 
picture of the animal 
 Dependent variable: Cued recall test of information 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 1: Results 
 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Intro & Hypothesis 
On the other hand, Opinions among educators and authors of children's beginning readers about 
the value of illustrations range from those who believe that pictures serve an essential function in 
the instructional process to those who believe that pictures serve no useful purpose and that they 
may interfere with children's learning to read (Aukerman, 1971; Chall, 1967).  
H2: Pictures would improve the speed and accuracy of reading. 
(Page Ends) 
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Study 2: Methods 
Thirty-two second graders were asked to read aloud a list of words by with either no pictures or 
associated pictures.  
In the control condition, the words were simply printed on the page in three rows of five.  
In the picture condition each of the 15 words was superimposed on a related picture, for example 
the word cat was superimposed on an outline of a dog. Subjects were asked to read the words on 
the page aloud as quickly as possible.  
Dependent variables: time and accuracy (# of errors) 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Results 
 
(Page Ends) 
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APPENDIX C 
TOPIC PASSAGE FOR TASK 
 
 
 67 
PLEASE READ OUT LOUD ONCE, AND READ IT OVER UNTIL YOU CAN 
PARAPHRASE THE HYPOTHESIS IN YOUR OWN WORDS BECAUSE YOU WILL BE 
ASKED TO DO SO 
 
Destination Memory vs. Source Memory 
 
Everyone has recounted a story or joke to someone only to experience a nagging feeling 
that they may already have told this person this information. It is for this reason that people 
sometimes preface a story with ‘‘stop me if I’ve told you this before.’’ Remembering to whom 
one has told things not only can help one avoid social embarrassment, but also may be critical in 
some situations. For example, supervisors need to remember to whom they told specific 
information or delegated particular responsibilities so that they may assess progress and 
accurately gauge employees’ workloads, and liars need to keep track of the information that they 
have told to particular people to avoid getting caught telling incongruent stories. Remembering 
to whom one has told things also is necessary for facilitating everyday interactions, such as 
conversations with friends. People can assume a common ground and continue where they left 
off only if they remember what they told to different friends (cf. the given-new contract—
Haviland & Clark, 1974). Consequently, in daily interactions, people need to remember not only 
who told them things, or the source of information, but also to whom they told things, or the 
destination of information. 
The processes involved in remembering the source of information (e.g., in conversations, 
who told you something) have been comprehensively studied and are referred to as source 
memory (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; for a review, see, e.g., Mitchell & Johnson, 
2000). Studying source memory makes sense, given the importance attached to remembering 
sources. For example, remembering that information was obtained from CNN rather than MTV 
is likely to determine how that information is used. Yet the inverse situation—remembering the 
people one has told something to—is often important as well. Thus, it is surprising that 
researchers know very little about the processes involved in remembering the destination of 
information that people output. We refer to these processes, by analogy, as destination memory. 
Gopie (2009) recently conducted two studies to examine which memory is more fallible 
and why.  
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Hypotheses 
H1: Source memory is more fallible because self-generated information is 
usually better remembered  
H2: Destination memory is more fallible because outgoing information is 
not as well integrated with its context (i.e., the person whom one tells a fact) 
 
YOU WILL BE PROVIDED WITH GOPIE’S HYPOTHESES, METHODS, AND RESULTS. 
YOUR TASK IS TO INTERPRET THE RESULTS IN ORDER TO ANSWER GIVEN 
QUESTIONS. 
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APPENDIX D 
MATERIALS FOR TASK 
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Questions 
You will be asked to type your answers for these questions once you said you are done 
interpreting the results and ready to give your answers. You can refer back to your notes and task 
window while answering. 
1. Was the hypothesis of Study 1 confirmed? If so, what are the evidence? If not, what are the 
evidence? 
2. Was the hypothesis of Study 2 confirmed? If so, what are the evidence? If not, what are the 
evidence? 
3. Are results of Study 1 and 2 congruent? If so, in what ways and if not, in what ways? 
4. If you've answered that there was inconsistency in the findings of the two studies, how would 
you reconcile the findings? In other words, what do you think could account for these 
inconsistent results? Propose at least one hypothesis about the results. 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 1: Intro 
Self-generated information is usually better remembered than other-generated information 
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Therefore, memory to whom something was delivered might also be 
better than memory from whom it was received, all other factors being equal. At this juncture it 
remains an open empirical question of whether source memory or target memory differ from one 
another because they have never been directly compared. In addition, if they do differ, then no 
existing theory specifies whether memory might favor source versus target information. 
Gopie conducted a direct comparison of source memory (i.e., information input) to target 
memory (i.e., information output) holding all other experimental variables constant. His 
 71 
hypothesis was that input and output are differentially remembered only when a decision 
component is involved.  
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 1: Hypothesis 
The purpose of Study 1 was to test conditions in which participants received and gave away 
equal numbers of objects from two fictitious people. The use of male versus female sources has a 
long tradition in the source-monitoring literature (e.g. Ferguson et al. , 1992; Johnson et al. , 
1995). Consequently, Gopie decided to use fictitious male and female names as the sources and 
targets in this experiment.  
H1: Source memory is more fallible because self-generated information is usually better 
remembered. Specifically, memory for giving someone an object should be better than memory 
for receiving an object because giving an object involves a decision. 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 1: Methods (1) 
Within-subject design and 18 undergraduates participated. 
Source monitoring condition: 60 objects (e.g., book, telephone) were presented with half of the 
items randomly assigned to each of the two female sources (from Sally or from Mary) 
 Target monitoring condition: an object label appeared in the center of the screen and participants 
had been instructed to press a key to give away the object to either of the two male sources (to 
Derek or to Robby); participants were instructed not to use any special strategy such as assigning 
all of the objects from one of the females to one of the males (Page Ends) 
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Study 1: Methods (2) 
Memory test: 30 new items were intermingled with the old items as distractors; an object label 
was presented and the query ‘From Sally or Mary?’ appeared beneath it. Participants pressed one 
of three keys to indicate from whom they thought they had received the object (or was new). 
Then the query ‘To Derek or Robby?’ appeared for participants to respond. 
Independent Variables: source and target monitoring 
Dependent Variables: proportions of correct identifications and confusions 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Results 
 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Intro 
On the other hand, previous research demonstrated that encoding of the external environment is 
disrupted when actions are performed by oneself rather than by someone else. For example, 
Koriat et al. found that when participants performed, as opposed to watched, such as raising their 
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hands or stirring water in a cup, their memory for the context (i.e., the room in which the task 
was performed) was worse for self-performed tasks than for other-performed tasks. On this basis, 
Koriat et al. proposed that output events are not as well integrated with their environmental 
context as are input events. In the case of incoming information, rich associative links are formed 
between an event and its environment. In contrast, output events are less strongly  integrated 
with their context because people perceive their own behavior as belonging more to themselves 
than to their environment. Consequently, for output events, people associate their behavior with 
their internal mental processes rather than with the environment. 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Hypothesis 
The goal of Study 2 was to investigate which memory (destination memory or source memory) is 
more error prone than source memory. Gopie accomplished this by having participants either tell 
facts to pictures of famous people (destination memory episodes ) or learn facts from pictures of 
famous people (source memory episodes). Subsequent recognition tests assessed memory for 
individual components of these episodes and for destination memory or source memory. 
H2: Destination memory is more fallible because outgoing information is not as well integrated 
with its context (i.e., the person to whom one tells a fact) as is incoming information (i.e., the 
person from whom one learns a fact). 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Methods (1) 
Sixty undergraduates participated. Half was randomly assigned to each condition. 
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Destination condition: participants were instructed to tell the facts to the faces. After a fixation 
cross, a fact was presented. After reading the fact silently, the participant pressed a key, which 
resulted in a blank screen, followed by a color picture of a famous person. The participant was to 
tell the famous person the fact that he or she had just read. This procedure repeated until the 
participant had told each of the 50 facts to a different face. 
Source condition: participants were instructed that facts would be told to them by famous people. 
After a fixation cross, a famous person’s face appeared. After viewing the famous face, a key 
press resulted in a blank screen, and then a fact. The participant read the fact that the depicted 
famous person was ‘‘telling’’ him or her. This procedure repeated until the participant was told 
each of the 50 facts by a different face 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Methods (2) 
Item memory test: 20 facts and 20 faces (half of which participants had studied, and half of 
which they had not studied) were randomly ordered and individually presented. The participant 
responded yes or no whether that item had appeared during the study phase.  
Associative memory test: 40 face-fact pairs were shown in random order: Twenty pairs had been 
presented during the study phase, and the other 20 were random re-pairings. Participants reported 
whether they had  previously told that fact to that face (destination condition) or whether that 
face had told them that fact (source condition).  
Independent Variables: condition (destination or source) and item type (face, fact, and face-fact 
pair) 
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Dependent Variables: hits (rate of correct yes), false alarms (rate of incorrect yes), and correct 
recognition (proportion of hits minus proportion of false alarms) 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Results (1) 
 
(Page Ends) 
 
Study 2: Results (2) 
 
(Page Ends) 
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Study 2: Results (3) 
There were significant main effects of study condition, F (1, 58) = 12.02, p = .001, η2=.17, and 
of item type, F (2, 116) = 122.65, p < .001, η2 = .68, as well as a significant interaction of study 
condition with item type, F (2, 116) =  9.77, p < .001, η2 = .14. 
(Page Ends) 
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APPENDIX E 
TASK QUESTION ANSWER WINDOW 
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STRATEGY SURVEY 
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APPENDIX G 
COGNITIVE LOAD SURVEY 
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APPENDIX H 
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY 
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APPENDIX I 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TIME AND ACCURACY 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics for time and accuracy 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Practice time (minutes) 
Novice 30 5.1 1.0 0.2 34 6.1 2.0 0.3 
Expert 19 6.1 1.4 0.3 19 5.6 1.1 0.3 
 Window time (minutes) 
Novice 30 13.6 4.0 0.7 34 19.2 8.2 1.4 
Expert 19 20.1 9.3 2.1 19 15.7 4.5 1.0 
 Answering time (minutes) 
Novice 30 12.1 5.3 1.0 34 11.5 4.8 0.8 
Expert 19 17.5 8.6 2.0 19 17.1 6.4 1.5 
 Total time (minutes) = Window time + Answering time 
Novice 30 25.7 8.1 1.5 34 30.7 10.2 1.7 
Expert 19 37.6 14.6 3.4 19 32.8 8.8 2.0 
 Total task accuracy (percentages) 
Novice 30 40.0 26.7 5.2 34 27.2 22.5 4.9 
Expert 19 44.7 35.9 6.4 19 56.6 28.7 6.4 
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APPENDIX J 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FIRST PASS FIXATION MEASURES 
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J.1 COUNT OF FIRST PASS FIXATIONS BY PAGE 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for first pass fixation measures: Count 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total fixation count 
Novice 29 1410.7 479.2 89.0 32 441.1 414.4 73.3 
Expert 19 1560.2 487.8 111.9 19 553.7 215.6 49.5 
 Fixation count: Questions 
Novice 29 62.4 45.0 8.4 32 25.2 36.5 6.4 
Expert 19 62.1 23.9 5.5 19 21.7 24.5 5.6 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 29 156.7 72.8 13.5 32 44.2 69.9 12.4 
Expert 19 157.4 55.6 12.7 19 70.4 74.2 17.0 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 96.6 47.8 8.9 32 26.1 41.0 7.2 
Expert 19 130.6 83.3 19.1 19 53.7 54.6 12.5 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 127.1 62.2 11.6 32 52.1 75.1 13.3 
Expert 19 171.3 70.2 16.1 19 46.7 52.5 12.0 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 78.6 31.6 5.9 32 24.1 37.7 6.7 
Expert 19 80.8 25.8 5.9 19 22.6 32.2 7.4 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Results 
Novice 29 116.8 63.2 11.7 32 32.9 43.6 7.7 
Expert 19 143.2 111.9 25.7 19 62.9 57.8 13.3 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 29 134.1 102.3 19.0 32 54.8 67.2 11.9 
Expert 19 150.6 91.0 20.9 19 75.0 91.4 21.0 
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 Fixation count: Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 125.3 78.0 14.5 32 38.0 59.9 10.6 
Expert 19 115.6 59.1 13.6 19 37.9 55.5 12.7 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 140.6 68.6 12.7 32 42.8 65.3 11.5 
Expert 19 161.6 67.6 15.5 19 33.5 52.2 12.0 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 154.5 58.3 10.8 32 34.8 71.2 12.6 
Expert 19 151.2 96.4 22.1 19 56.9 60.3 13.8 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 29 99.2 45.8 8.5 32 26.7 38.3 6.8 
Expert 19 107.4 77.3 17.7 19 35.4 37.4 8.6 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 29 60.4 35.9 6.7 32 17.0 15.6 2.8 
Expert 19 64.5 32.0 7.3 19 13.7 17.0 3.9 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 29 58.4 35.1 6.5 32 22.4 18.3 3.2 
Expert 19 63.9 38.2 8.8 19 23.3 19.8 4.5 
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J.2 AVERAGE OF FIRST PASS FIXATIONS BY PAGE 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for first pass fixation measures: Average 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total average fixation  
Novice 29 264.8 47.2 8.8 32 238.4 46.3 8.2 
Expert 19 251.1 45.6 10.5 19 243.2 44.9 10.3 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Questions 
Novice 24 233.1 37.7 7.7 29 206.7 56.8 10.5 
Expert 19 226.7 42.0 9.6 15 213.9 54.3 14.0 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 29 252.4 49.7 9.2 31 270.6 153.0 27.5 
Expert 19 248.8 47.4 10.9 19 270.2 144.6 33.2 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 28 254.2 51.3 9.7 30 266.5 103.5 18.9 
Expert 18 240.1 49.0 11.5 17 261.6 95.4 23.1 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 252.7 51.7 9.6 32 227.5 78.3 13.8 
Expert 19 246.1 43.1 9.9 19 283.1 274.7 63.0 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 260.7 54.2 10.1 29 250.6 121.8 22.6 
Expert 19 246.6 50.5 11.6 18 216.8 66.5 15.7 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Results 
Novice 29 288.9 54.9 10.2 31 250.5 66.2 11.9 
Expert 19 272.6 62.5 14.3 19 269.0 78.4 18.0 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 28 281.7 79.7 15.1 30 253.2 147.7 27.0 
Expert 19 240.7 56.3 12.9 19 232.4 63.6 14.6 
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 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 28 250.6 48.4 9.1 30 263.1 125.9 23.0 
Expert 18 250.1 53.1 12.5 17 238.7 144.7 35.1 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 28 259.7 69.0 13.0 31 203.3 62.2 11.2 
Expert 19 245.4 55.1 12.6 18 253.9 82.1 19.4 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 261.9 45.4 8.4 32 235.8 110.4 19.5 
Expert 19 258.1 77.6 17.8 19 233.4 53.9 12.4 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 29 271.4 53.7 10.0 32 205.4 55.8 9.9 
Expert 19 259.1 44.4 10.2 19 234.6 51.9 11.9 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 29 276.0 47.2 8.8 32 232.4 89.9 15.9 
Expert 19 253.6 49.7 11.4 19 210.9 61.2 14.0 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 29 289.4 59.5 11.1 32 240.3 61.6 10.9 
Expert 19 274.4 55.4 12.7 19 232.9 61.2 14.0 
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J.3 SUM OF FIRST PASS FIXATIONS BY PAGE 
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for first pass fixation measures: Sum 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total sum of fixation duration (minutes) 
Novice 29 6.2 2.4 0.4 32 1.8 1.8 0.3 
Expert 19 6.6 2.7 0.6 19 2.3 1.0 0.2 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Questions 
Novice 29 15.1 12.0 2.2 32 6.0 9.0 1.6 
Expert 19 14.7 7.1 1.6 19 5.1 6.5 1.5 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds):  Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 29 39.9 20.5 3.8 32 11.3 19.0 3.4 
Expert 19 39.3 16.0 3.7 19 16.6 17.8 4.1 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 24.7 13.6 2.5 32 6.5 10.8 1.9 
Expert 19 32.3 24.8 5.7 19 12.0 12.3 2.8 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 32.6 16.7 3.1 32 13.1 20.0 3.5 
Expert 19 42.1 18.1 4.2 19 11.5 13.9 3.2 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 20.8 9.8 1.8 32 5.7 9.2 1.6 
Expert 19 20.2 8.4 1.9 19 5.4 8.0 1.8 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Results 
Novice 29 34.8 22.4 4.2 32 8.8 12.8 2.3 
Expert 19 40.0 33.5 7.7 19 18.7 18.8 4.3 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 29 34.7 25.7 4.8 32 13.9 17.8 3.2 
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Expert 19 38.5 25.5 5.9 19 18.4 22.7 5.2 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 32.0 22.2 4.1 32 10.0 16.3 2.9 
Expert 19 29.4 16.9 3.9 19 9.4 14.9 3.4 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 36.2 21.3 4.0 32 10.3 17.4 3.1 
Expert 19 40.1 18.9 4.3 19 9.3 16.9 3.9 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 41.0 17.7 3.3 32 8.1 17.1 3.0 
Expert 19 38.1 25.4 5.8 19 14.8 16.9 3.9 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 29 27.2 14.4 2.7 32 6.7 10.3 1.8 
Expert 19 28.9 23.8 5.5 19 8.9 10.2 2.3 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 29 16.4 10.2 1.9 32 4.4 4.6 0.8 
Expert 19 16.7 10.7 2.5 19 3.4 4.9 1.1 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 29 17.3 11.9 2.2 32 5.7 4.7 0.8 
Expert 19 16.7 9.5 2.2 19 5.7 4.9 1.1 
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APPENDIX K 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR RETURN FIXATION MEASURES 
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K.1 COUNT OF RETURN FIXATIONS BY PAGE 
Table 11. Descriptive statistics for return fixation measures: Count 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total fixation count 
Novice 29 419.9 338.6 62.9 32 1720.1 903.2 159.7 
Expert 19 581.6 330.7 75.9 19 1655.2 575.4 132.0 
 Fixation count: Questions 
Novice 29 19.2 37.9 7.0 32 121.9 103.0 18.2 
Expert 19 46.2 62.8 14.4 19 96.4 93.9 21.5 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 29 6.6 21.8 4.0 32 124.3 103.5 18.3 
Expert 19 9.2 28.0 6.4 19 99.8 97.2 22.3 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 22.9 52.3 9.7 32 149.8 144.9 25.6 
Expert 19 32.8 53.7 12.3 19 97.1 74.5 17.1 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 15.2 37.3 6.9 32 154.6 117.4 20.7 
Expert 19 41.1 53.1 12.2 19 151.2 81.3 18.6 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 35.8 54.8 10.2 32 110.9 94.4 16.7 
Expert 19 34.4 35.5 8.1 19 94.2 37.2 8.5 
 Fixation count: Study 1 Results 
Novice 29 129.4 129.4 24.0 32 230.3 192.7 34.1 
Expert 19 123.5 111.1 25.5 19 160.5 99.1 22.7 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 29 14.3 57.5 10.7 32 124.4 123.2 21.8 
Expert 19 23.8 55.5 12.7 19 101.5 95.9 22.0 
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 Fixation count: Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 13.5 23.9 4.4 32 139.1 125.9 22.3 
Expert 19 15.7 27.1 6.2 19 128.4 78.0 17.9 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 21.1 40.1 7.4 32 139.0 100.4 17.8 
Expert 19 29.3 61.8 14.2 19 144.9 95.0 21.8 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 46.4 84.4 15.7 32 176.7 119.2 21.1 
Expert 19 70.7 86.1 19.8 19 183.4 123.0 28.2 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 29 47.1 61.2 11.4 32 121.6 98.7 17.5 
Expert 19 46.5 52.8 12.1 19 162.1 72.3 16.6 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 29 33.8 41.5 7.7 32 77.8 51.4 9.1 
Expert 19 88.3 76.9 17.6 19 173.2 110.5 25.3 
 Fixation count: Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 29 14.6 24.8 4.6 32 49.8 60.4 10.7 
Expert 19 20.2 31.7 7.3 19 62.5 39.7 9.1 
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K.2 AVERAGE OF RETURN FIXATIONS BY PAGE 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics for return fixation measures: Average 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total average fixation  
Novice 25 262.2 50.0 10.0 32 268.1 52.7 9.3 
Expert 19 256.1 48.8 11.2 19 263.1 45.4 10.4 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Questions 
Novice 9 244.5 31.5 10.5 27 262.4 103.1 19.8 
Expert 13 239.1 59.5 16.5 15 259.8 64.9 16.7 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 3 252.1 27.3 15.8 30 288.7 79.1 14.4 
Expert 3 240.2 96.3 55.6 19 321.2 120.2 27.6 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 10 248.5 31.0 9.8 27 268.3 51.9 10.0 
Expert 9 248.6 66.7 22.2 17 278.1 133.0 32.3 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 7 243.6 67.2 25.4 31 250.9 56.1 10.1 
Expert 10 228.9 49.4 15.6 19 239.4 44.1 10.1 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 15 243.5 54.3 14.0 28 252.3 62.8 11.9 
Expert 15 242.8 58.9 15.2 18 245.3 49.4 11.6 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 1 Results 
Novice 22 278.4 74.5 15.9 31 287.0 59.1 10.6 
Expert 17 281.0 66.3 16.1 19 280.2 74.3 17.0 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 3 257.2 25.5 14.7 29 311.3 114.3 21.2 
Expert 4 183.7 41.5 20.7 19 304.7 84.1 19.3 
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 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 10 268.8 59.4 18.8 30 269.0 49.4 9.0 
Expert 6 225.2 55.9 22.8 17 245.8 45.1 10.9 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 12 274.5 68.4 19.8 31 268.5 81.7 14.7 
Expert 9 238.1 61.6 20.5 18 237.9 39.4 9.3 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 14 259.2 70.5 18.8 32 235.3 63.8 11.3 
Expert 13 235.1 51.6 14.3 19 239.6 48.3 11.1 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 14 277.1 52.4 14.0 31 258.7 45.0 8.1 
Expert 13 250.3 49.5 13.7 19 252.4 45.8 10.5 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 16 258.7 40.1 10.0 32 257.2 49.6 8.8 
Expert 16 278.7 73.0 18.2 19 254.7 44.8 10.3 
 Average fixation duration (ms): Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 11 308.9 61.6 18.6 29 284.2 94.5 17.6 
Expert 9 279.6 37.3 12.4 18 242.4 38.4 9.0 
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K.3 SUM OF RETURN FIXATIONS BY PAGE 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for return fixation measures: Sum 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total sum of fixation duration (minutes) 
Novice 29 1.9 1.6 0.3 32 7.7 4.3 0.8 
Expert 19 2.5 1.6 0.4 19 6.9 2.8 0.6 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Questions 
Novice 29 4.8 9.8 1.8 32 30.0 26.3 4.7 
Expert 19 11.4 15.3 3.5 19 23.8 24.5 5.6 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 29 1.6 5.5 1.0 32 35.9 29.0 5.1 
Expert 19 2.6 7.6 1.8 19 26.9 25.0 5.7 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 5.7 13.2 2.5 32 41.6 41.9 7.4 
Expert 19 8.9 15.6 3.6 19 23.1 17.4 4.0 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 3.9 10.6 2.0 32 40.4 31.5 5.6 
Expert 19 9.8 14.1 3.2 19 35.8 20.8 4.8 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 9.1 16.0 3.0 32 29.5 27.3 4.8 
Expert 19 8.4 8.4 1.9 19 23.6 11.2 2.6 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Results 
Novice 29 34.8 38.6 7.2 32 68.1 60.5 10.7 
Expert 19 34.8 33.8 7.8 19 42.4 27.8 6.4 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 29 3.8 15.8 2.9 32 33.7 31.8 5.6 
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Expert 19 4.8 11.4 2.6 19 27.3 26.1 6.0 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 3.6 6.2 1.2 32 37.0 33.0 5.8 
Expert 19 3.9 7.4 1.7 19 31.4 20.5 4.7 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 6.3 12.9 2.4 32 37.3 31.1 5.5 
Expert 19 8.2 18.7 4.3 19 35.6 27.4 6.3 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 11.6 21.3 4.0 32 45.0 34.0 6.0 
Expert 19 16.8 21.2 4.9 19 43.5 29.3 6.7 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 29 12.8 17.1 3.2 32 32.1 27.3 4.8 
Expert 19 11.8 13.2 3.0 19 41.2 20.5 4.7 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 29 9.0 11.4 2.1 32 20.0 13.5 2.4 
Expert 19 23.6 21.0 4.8 19 45.1 31.3 7.2 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 29 4.4 7.2 1.3 32 13.4 16.5 2.9 
Expert 19 5.6 9.1 2.1 19 16.0 12.1 2.8 
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APPENDIX L 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR OFF SCREEN GAZE MEASURES 
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L.1 COUNT OF OFF SCREEN GAZE 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics for off screen gaze measures: Count 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Off screen gaze duration total 
Novice 29 280.8 150.1 27.9 32 469.0 419.6 74.2 
Expert 19 475.4 330.3 75.8 19 334.9 184.6 42.3 
 Off screen gaze duration longer than 500ms 
Novice 29 30.1 26.1 4.9 32 68.6 78.0 13.8 
Expert 19 78.7 85.9 19.7 19 43.5 47.1 10.8 
 Off screen gaze duration longer than 2000ms 
Novice 29 14.2 15.5 2.9 32 33.7 32.9 5.8 
Expert 19 41.2 43.8 10.1 19 21.9 24.1 5.5 
L.2 AVERAGE OF OFF SCREEN GAZE DURATION 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics for off screen gaze measures: Average 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Off screen gaze duration total (ms) 
Novice 29 553.7 516.0 95.8 32 763.5 720.2 127.3 
Expert 19 957.8 791.8 181.6 19 723.2 783.7 179.8 
 Off screen gaze duration longer than 500ms (seconds) 
Novice 29 3.7 2.6 0.5 32 4.3 3.0 0.5 
Expert 19 5.5 5.7 1.3 19 4.0 3.1 0.7 
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 Off screen gaze duration longer than 2000ms (seconds) 
Novice 26 7.0 4.2 0.8 26 8.3 6.0 1.2 
Expert 19 7.4 6.2 1.4 19 6.2 4.0 0.9 
L.3 SUM OF OFF SCREEN GAZE DURATION 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics for off screen gaze measures: Sum 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Off screen gaze duration total (minutes) 
Novice 29 2.3 2.0 0.4 32 5.5 5.5 1.0 
Expert 19 6.5 6.2 1.4 19 3.2 2.5 0.6 
 Off screen gaze duration longer than 500ms (minutes) 
Novice 29 1.9 2.0 0.4 32 4.8 4.9 0.9 
Expert 19 5.9 6.2 1.4 19 2.7 2.5 0.6 
 Off screen gaze duration longer than 2000ms (minutes) 
Novice 29 1.7 1.9 0.4 32 4.2 4.3 0.8 
Expert 19 5.2 5.6 1.3 19 2.3 2.1 0.5 
L.4 SUM OF OFF SCREEN GAZE DURATION LONGER THAN 2000MS BY PAGE 
Table 17. Descriptive statistics for off screen gaze measures: Sum longer than 2000ms 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Questions 
Novice 29 6.3 17.4 3.2 32 32.6 77.9 13.8 
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Expert 19 26.6 52.9 12.1 19 4.3 7.2 1.7 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 29 5.1 10.7 2.0 32 7.5 24.7 4.4 
Expert 19 15.8 25.0 5.7 19 4.0 11.2 2.6 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 9.7 12.6 2.3 32 18.5 30.4 5.4 
Expert 19 28.5 32.2 7.4 19 8.6 17.4 4.0 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 4.5 11.2 2.1 32 17.5 38.1 6.7 
Expert 19 12.4 16.5 3.8 19 11.2 17.0 3.9 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 4.9 11.4 2.1 32 19.2 38.7 6.8 
Expert 19 15.5 20.8 4.8 19 10.6 16.8 3.8 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 1 Results 
Novice 29 20.8 29.7 5.5 32 31.6 40.3 7.1 
Expert 19 45.1 64.2 14.7 19 22.2 36.1 8.3 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 29 5.3 10.7 2.0 32 8.2 21.7 3.8 
Expert 19 29.8 35.5 8.2 19 3.5 10.7 2.5 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 12.9 17.0 3.1 32 32.5 74.1 13.1 
Expert 19 18.0 34.1 7.8 19 10.5 20.5 4.7 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 3.8 10.2 1.9 32 8.3 17.9 3.2 
Expert 19 19.3 24.9 5.7 19 5.4 12.6 2.9 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 3.9 10.9 2.0 32 36.9 63.6 11.2 
Expert 19 32.0 50.6 11.6 19 18.6 42.4 9.7 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 29 12.9 19.3 3.6 32 11.3 23.3 4.1 
Expert 19 26.4 32.5 7.5 19 8.2 13.1 3.0 
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 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 29 8.5 17.6 3.3 32 12.3 25.4 4.5 
Expert 19 34.9 50.1 11.5 19 9.3 13.5 3.1 
 Sum of fixation duration (seconds): Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 29 0.9 2.2 0.4 32 16.6 38.0 6.7 
Expert 19 9.0 14.1 3.2 19 24.9 26.9 6.3 
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Table 18. Note content analyses 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total note amount (1: little, 2: light, 3: medium, 4: heavy) 
Novice 29 1.5 1.3 0.2 32 2.3 1.3 0.2 
Expert 19 2.6 1.2 0.3 19 1.9 1.2 0.3 
 Note amount: Questions 
Novice 21 0.4 1.1 0.2 27 0.1 0.6 0.1 
Expert 17 0.2 0.8 0.2 15 0.1 0.3 0.1 
 Note amount: Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 21 0.4 0.6 0.1 27 0.3 0.8 0.2 
Expert 17 0.7 0.8 0.2 15 0.3 0.6 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 21 1.1 1.0 0.2 27 0.9 0.7 0.1 
Expert 17 1.4 0.9 0.2 15 1.0 0.9 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 21 0.2 0.4 0.1 27 0.7 1.1 0.2 
Expert 17 0.8 0.8 0.2 15 0.8 0.8 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 21 0.3 0.8 0.2 27 0.7 1.1 0.2 
Expert 17 1.1 1.2 0.3 15 0.5 0.9 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 1 Results 
Novice 21 1.0 1.1 0.2 27 0.9 1.1 0.2 
Expert 17 1.7 1.2 0.3 15 1.9 1.0 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 21 0.2 0.7 0.2 27 0.5 0.9 0.2 
Expert 17 0.6 1.1 0.3 15 0.3 0.6 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 21 1.0 0.9 0.2 27 1.0 0.9 0.2 
Expert 17 1.1 0.9 0.2 15 0.8 0.9 0.2 
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 Note amount: Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 21 0.2 0.6 0.1 27 0.6 0.8 0.2 
Expert 17 0.9 0.9 0.2 15 0.5 0.9 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 21 0.2 0.6 0.1 27 1.0 1.4 0.3 
Expert 17 1.7 1.4 0.3 15 0.8 1.1 0.3 
 Note amount: Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 21 0.6 1.1 0.2 27 0.7 1.1 0.2 
Expert 17 1.1 1.1 0.3 15 1.0 0.9 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 21 0.6 0.8 0.2 27 0.7 1.1 0.2 
Expert 17 0.8 1.0 0.3 15 0.7 0.9 0.2 
 Note amount: Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 21 0.2 0.5 0.1 27 0.6 1.0 0.2 
Expert 17 0.6 0.9 0.2 15 1.0 1.0 0.3 
 Number of integrative notes 
Novice 21 0.1 0.3 0.1 27 0.2 0.6 0.1 
Expert 17 0.6 0.8 0.2 15 0.4 0.6 0.2 
 Number of inferences written 
Novice 21 1.4 1.6 0.3 27 2.3 2.1 0.4 
Expert 17 2.4 2.4 0.6 15 2.3 1.5 0.4 
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APPENDIX N 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SURVEYS 
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N.1 STRATEGY SURVEY 
Table 19. Descriptive statistics for surveys: Strategy survey 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Had trouble remembering info & had to look back 
Novice 30 3.7 0.9 0.2 34 3.9 0.9 0.2 
Expert 19 3.8 0.9 0.2 19 3.2 1.3 0.3 
 Relied on information on the screen instead of remembering 
Novice 30 3.1 1.2 0.2 34 3.8 0.9 0.2 
Expert 19 3.4 1.2 0.3 19 3.2 1.3 0.3 
 Had trouble finding the information I need 
Novice 30 1.9 1.1 0.2 34 1.8 1.2 0.2 
Expert 19 1.9 1.2 0.3 19 1.3 0.6 0.1 
 All the information from different page blurred 
Novice 30 2.0 1.1 0.2 34 1.7 0.9 0.2 
Expert 19 1.9 1.1 0.2 19 1.4 0.7 0.2 
 Had trouble remembering hypotheses 
Novice 30 2.5 1.4 0.3 34 2.5 1.3 0.2 
Expert 19 2.5 1.5 0.3 19 2.0 1.0 0.2 
 Purposely tried to keep numbers in my head 
Novice 30 1.7 0.9 0.2 34 1.6 1.0 0.2 
Expert 19 1.5 0.9 0.2 19 1.8 1.1 0.3 
 Information from one page confused with another 
Novice 30 1.8 0.9 0.2 34 2.1 1.1 0.2 
Expert 19 2.1 1.1 0.2 19 1.5 0.7 0.2 
 Got lost where I was in the task 
Novice 30 1.9 1.0 0.2 34 1.8 1.1 0.2 
Expert 19 1.4 0.9 0.2 19 1.4 0.9 0.2 
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 Trying to get it done: 1 = quickly, 3 = neutral, 5 = correctly 
Novice 30 3.9 1.1 0.2 34 4.3 0.8 0.1 
Expert 19 4.4 0.6 0.1 19 4.5 0.7 0.2 
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N.2 COGNITIVE LOAD SURVEY 
Table 20. Descriptive statistics for surveys: Cognitive load survey 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Task overall: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 4.0 1.2 0.2 34 5.0 1.7 0.3 
Expert 19 4.7 1.6 0.4 19 4.4 1.6 0.4 
 Task overall: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 5.2 1.5 0.3 34 5.9 1.4 0.2 
Expert 19 5.6 1.6 0.4 19 5.1 1.7 0.4 
 Task itself: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 4.4 1.4 0.2 34 4.8 1.5 0.3 
Expert 19 5.1 1.4 0.3 19 3.8 1.5 0.3 
 Task itself: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 4.7 1.3 0.2 34 5.8 1.5 0.3 
Expert 19 5.3 1.4 0.3 19 4.1 1.4 0.3 
 Window design: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 3.5 2.1 0.4 34 2.3 1.6 0.3 
Expert 19 4.0 1.5 0.3 19 2.1 0.9 0.2 
 Window design: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 3.9 1.9 0.4 34 2.7 1.7 0.3 
Expert 19 3.6 1.6 0.4 19 1.9 0.8 0.2 
 Understanding theory: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 2.9 1.0 0.2 34 3.6 1.8 0.3 
Expert 19 2.4 1.0 0.2 19 3.1 1.4 0.3 
 Understanding theory: How much mental effort 
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Novice 30 3.6 1.4 0.2 34 4.3 1.9 0.3 
Expert 19 2.8 1.2 0.3 19 3.4 1.8 0.4 
 Understanding methods: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 3.3 1.6 0.3 34 4.1 1.7 0.3 
Expert 19 3.3 1.4 0.3 19 2.8 1.5 0.4 
 Understanding methods: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 3.8 1.4 0.3 34 4.6 1.8 0.3 
Expert 19 3.7 1.5 0.3 19 3.2 1.8 0.4 
 Understanding results: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 4.8 1.4 0.3 34 5.1 2.0 0.3 
Expert 19 4.5 1.5 0.3 19 3.5 1.8 0.4 
 Understanding results: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 5.0 1.4 0.3 34 5.6 2.0 0.4 
Expert 19 5.2 1.6 0.4 19 3.8 1.6 0.4 
 Integrating theory and methods: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 3.7 1.3 0.2 34 4.2 1.9 0.3 
Expert 19 3.4 1.3 0.3 19 3.5 1.6 0.4 
 Integrating theory and methods: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 3.9 1.4 0.3 34 4.6 1.9 0.3 
Expert 19 3.8 1.5 0.3 19 3.9 1.6 0.4 
 Integrating methods and results: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 4.5 1.5 0.3 34 4.6 2.0 0.3 
Expert 19 3.8 1.5 0.3 19 3.5 1.5 0.3 
 Integrating methods and results: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 5.1 1.5 0.3 34 5.0 2.1 0.4 
Expert 19 4.1 1.4 0.3 19 3.8 1.7 0.4 
 Integrating results and results: How easy or difficult 
Novice 30 4.2 1.9 0.3 34 4.7 1.8 0.3 
Expert 19 4.2 1.7 0.4 19 3.3 1.8 0.4 
 Integrating results and results: How much mental effort 
Novice 30 4.5 1.5 0.3 34 5.0 1.9 0.3 
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Expert 19 4.5 1.9 0.4 19 3.6 1.5 0.3 
 Total cognitive load: Perceived difficulty 
Novice 30 3.9 0.9 0.2 34 4.3 1.3 0.2 
Expert 19 3.9 0.9 0.2 19 3.3 1.0 0.2 
 Total cognitive load: Mental effort 
Novice 30 4.4 1.0 0.2 34 4.8 1.3 0.2 
Expert 19 4.3 1.0 0.2 19 3.6 1.1 0.3 
 Total cognitive load 
Novice 30 4.2 0.9 0.2 34 4.6 1.3 0.2 
Expert 19 4.1 0.9 0.2 19 3.5 1.0 0.2 
 
 120 
APPENDIX O 
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Table 21. Descriptive Statistics for page visits 
 Display format 
 Stacked Distributed 
Expertise level N M SD SE N M SD SE 
 Total number of visits 
Novice 29 20.6 5.8 1.1 32 156.8 84.3 14.9 
Expert 19 24.9 6.0 1.4 19 147.4 39.7 9.1 
 Number of visits: Questions 
Novice 29 1.3 1.0 0.2 32 16.8 14.9 2.6 
Expert 19 2.3 1.2 0.3 19 11.8 10.1 2.3 
 Number of visits: Study 1 Introduction 
Novice 29 1.1 0.3 0.1 32 8.5 6.8 1.2 
Expert 19 1.2 0.4 0.1 19 6.5 2.8 0.7 
 Number of visits: Study 1 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 1.4 0.8 0.1 32 13.4 12.0 2.1 
Expert 19 1.6 1.1 0.2 19 9.9 6.5 1.5 
 Number of visits: Study 1 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 1.3 0.7 0.1 32 13.5 10.2 1.8 
Expert 19 1.8 1.0 0.2 19 11.1 4.8 1.1 
 Number of visits: Study 1 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 1.9 1.2 0.2 32 11.7 8.6 1.5 
Expert 19 2.2 1.0 0.2 19 9.7 4.9 1.1 
 Number of visits: Study 1 Results 
Novice 29 2.7 1.5 0.3 32 18.3 14.9 2.6 
Expert 19 2.4 0.8 0.2 19 11.2 7.3 1.7 
 Number of visits: Study 2 Introduction 
Novice 29 1.1 0.4 0.1 32 6.9 5.6 1.0 
Expert 19 1.2 0.4 0.1 19 6.3 2.5 0.6 
 Number of visits: Study 2 Hypothesis 
Novice 29 1.4 0.7 0.1 32 10.4 9.4 1.7 
Expert 19 1.4 0.8 0.2 19 9.0 4.1 0.9 
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 Number of visits: Study 2 Methods (1) 
Novice 29 1.4 0.7 0.1 32 8.1 6.3 1.1 
Expert 19 1.7 0.9 0.2 19 9.2 5.4 1.3 
 Number of visits: Study 2 Methods (2) 
Novice 29 1.7 0.9 0.2 32 12.4 7.9 1.4 
Expert 19 2.1 1.1 0.3 19 13.9 9.2 2.1 
 Number of visits: Study 2 Results (1) 
Novice 29 2.0 1.2 0.2 32 16.1 15.3 2.7 
Expert 19 2.2 1.3 0.3 19 18.3 9.2 2.1 
 Number of visits: Study 2 Results (2) 
Novice 29 1.8 0.8 0.2 32 13.8 9.4 1.7 
Expert 19 3.1 1.7 0.4 19 20.7 13.5 3.1 
 Number of visits: Study 2 Results (3) 
Novice 29 1.4 0.6 0.1 32 7.1 6.6 1.2 
Expert 19 1.7 1.0 0.2 19 9.7 5.5 1.3 
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